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RELIGIOUS MEETINGS ON PUBLIC SCHOOL
PROPERTY: THE CONSTITUTIONAL
DIMENSIONS OF CHURCH-STATE
NEUTRALITY
I. INTRODUCTION
The public schools and universities have never been immune from
conflict between competing interpretations of basic federal constitu-
tional guarantees.' With respect to freedom of religion, however, the
public campus has been the principal battleground for controversies
which have hammered out the contours of the relationship between
church and state.
It is therefore not surprising that the most recent chapter in the
church-state controversy involves the public campus itself. An increas-
ing number of recent suits in state and lower federal courts have
presented the question of whether public educational institutions2 may
constitutionally permit religious groups the use of unoccupied build-
ings, facilities, or grounds for religious purposes during noninstruc-
tional hours.3 These cases have arisen in three related contexts:
(1) university level religious students have sought the use of state uni-
versity or college campus facilities to conduct voluntary student meet-
ings for purposes of prayer, religious study, or fellowship, either
informally or as a recognized campus club;4 (2) high school level reli-
1. See, e.g., Healy v. James, 408 U.S. 169 (1972) (state college may not, consistently
with association rights of students, withhold official recognition of a student organization
because of its parent organization's history of disputatious activities); Tinker v. Des Moines
Indep. Community School Dist., 393 U.S. 503 (1969) (wearing of armbands by public senior
and junior high school students in protest to Vietnam War held to be protected expression,
absent evidence of likelihood of substantial disruption or material interference with school
activities); Brown v. Board of Educ. 347 U.S. 483 (1954) (segregation of children in public
schools solely on basis of race, though races accorded substantially equal facilities, held to
deny minority group children equal protection of the laws in violation of fourteenth
amendment).
2. The term "public" as used herein means tax supported. The generic term "public
school" is intended to embrace both tax supported high schools and tax supported colleges
or universities. The two are differentiated herein only where the courts have differentiated
the issues in respect to each.
3. Alternatively, it might be asked whether such institutions may constitutionally deny
religious groups use of school facilities. See infra text accompanying notes 231-37.
4. Eg., Dittman v. Western Wash. Univ., No. 79-1189 (W.D. Wash. Feb. 28, 1980)
(memorandum opinion) (holding use of public university buildings for weekly religious
meetings unconstitutional), vacated as moot, No. 80-3120 (9th Cir. Mar. 30, 1982); Chess v.
Widmar, 635 F.2d 1310 (8th Cir. 1980) (holding denial of right to hold religious, student
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gious students have sought to use unoccupied public high school facili-
ties for meetings, and to form Bible study groups recognized and
supervised by the school administration, or to form other less formal
clubs;5 and (3) religious congregations have sought the temporary use
of unoccupied public school buildings after school hours or on week-
ends for worship services and religious instruction.6
In all three contexts, the public school facilities were not otherwise
utilized for any public purpose during the period of use by the religious
groups. In addition, in each circumstance, the public school had
opened up its facilities on an otherwise evenhanded basis to nonreli-
gious student groups as part of a policy of encouraging formation and
conduct of student groups to promote social and cultural awareness, or
had made available its facilities to nonreligious community groups as
part of a policy of maximizing use of tax supported facilities for the
benefit of the entire community. However, in each case, religious
groups were denied the same privilege to use the facilities.
With the factual stage thus set, the most interesting aspect of these
battles emerges: the principal adversaries' choice of constitutional
sword. State school officials have conceived these cases to be controlled
by the principle of separation between church and state as embodied in
the first amendment's "establishment clause."7 As grounds for denial,
officials have argued that any activity on the tax supported campus
which fairly may be characterized as "religious" violates the establish-
ment clause and must, on that ground, be resisted.
The religious groups, on the other hand, have conceived these
cases as controlled by federal constitutional guarantees of freedom of
meetings on university campus unconstitutional), aff'dsub nom. Widmar v. Vincent, 102 S.
Ct. 269 (1981); Keegan V. University of Del., 349 A.2d 14 (Del. 1975) (holding use of com-
mons room of university dormitory facilities for religious services constitutional, and denial
unconstitutional).
5. Brandon v. Board of Educ., 635 F.2d 971 (2d Cir. 1980) (holding that high school
students' use of unoccupied school room for voluntary prayer meetings before commence-
ment of classes would be unconstitutional); Trietley v. Board of Educ., 65 A.D.2d 1, 409
N.Y.S.2d 912 (1978) (holding that proposed student Bible study club would be unconstitu-
tional); Johnson v. Huntington Beach Union High School Dist., 68 Cal. App. 3d 1, 137 Cal.
Rptr. 43 (holding that permitting Bible study club to meet on public high school campus
during school day was unconstitutional), cert. denied, 434 U.S. 877 (1977).
6. Resnick v. East Brunswick Township Bd. of Educ., 77 N.J. 88, 389 A.2d 944 (1978)
(holding religious congregation's temporary use of public school buildings at rental rate re-
turning out-of-pocket costs of school board constitutional); Southside Estates Baptist
Church v. Board of Trustees, 115 So. 2d 697 (Fla. 1959) (holding the temporary use of public
schools by church congregation, pending construction of church facilities, constitutional).
7. U.S. CONST. amend. I provides in pertinent part: "Congress shall .make no law re-
specting an establishment of religion...."
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speech,8 freedom of religion,9 freedom of association,' 0 and equal pro-
tection of the laws." They typically claim only the same rights enjoyed
by nonreligious student or community groups to associate on campus to
further their beliefs or goals. Another typical argument is that the
withholding of such rights, based on religious status, discriminates un-
reasonably and places a stigma upon religious groups and upon reli-
gion generally. 2
The questions raised by the religious use of public school property
are significant because they place in sharp contrast-perhaps as no
other freedom of religion cases have-competing views of the proper
constitutional philosophy regarding church and state. For example, is
the issue merely that of church versus state, or is the issue a problem of
individual rights? How the issue is characterized may betray wider dif-
ferences in basic philosophy regarding the extent of permissible reli-
gious activity whenever state and religion interface.
The United States Supreme Court has had no occasion to rule on
the constitutionality of voluntary religious meetings by religious groups
on public school property during noninstructional hours. 13 The state
8. U.S. CONST. amend. I provides in pertinent part: "Congress shall make no law...
abridging the freedom of speech.... ." The right to freedom of speech was made applica-
ble to the states through the "liberty" provision of the due process clause of the fourteenth
amendment. Gitlow v. New York, 268 U.S. 652 (1925) (in sustaining conviction under state
criminal anarchy statute, Court assumed that the fourteenth amendment's due process
clause guaranteed freedom of speech).
9. U.S. CoNsT. amend. I provides in pertinent part: "Congress shall make no law re-
specting an establishment of religion, nor prohibiting the free exercise thereof ....
Within this quotation are found both of the religion clauses: the establishment clause and
the free exercise clause. The Supreme Court assumed that both religion clauses were appli-
cable to the states through the fourteenth amendment in Cantwell v. Connecticut, 310 U.S.
296 (1940) (invalidating under free exercise clause state statute regulating solicitation for
religious or charitable causes as applied to member of religious sect). The Court later specif-
ically held the establishment clause to be applicable to the states in Everson v. Board of
Educ., 330 U.S. 1 (1947) (upholding under establishment clause state statute authorizing
reimbursement to parents of funds expended to transport their children to church related
schools).
10. Though freedom of association is not expressly identified in the Constitution, the
freedom to engage in association for the advancement of ideas was held to be implicit in the
due process clause of the fourteenth amendment. NAACP v. Alabama ex rel. Patterson, 357
U.S. 449,460 (1958) (holding state could not compel national association to reveal member-
ship list of state members).
11. U.S. CONsT. amend. XIV provides in pertinent part: "No State shall... deny to
any person within its jurisdiction the equal protection of the laws."
12. See Brandon v. Board of Educ., 635 F.2d 971 (2d Cir. 1980) (holding that high
school students' use of unoccupied school room for voluntary prayer meetings before com-
mencement of classes would be unconstitutional).
13. But see infra notes 281-321 and accompanying text.
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and lower federal courts which thus far have ruled on the question
have reached widely divergent conclusions.
This comment addresses the federal constitutional questions
presented14 by the use of public school facilities by religious high
school and university students for religious activity and proposes some
answers to these questions.15 It reviews the religious meetings cases,' 6
first, from the viewpoint of the establishment clause as interpreted by
the Supreme Court, and second, from the perspective of individual
rights. Finally, it suggests a means of reconciling these apparently con-
flicting constitutional guarantees.
II. GOVERNING PRINCIPLES
The use of public school property for religious purposes is not
novel to American life or law. For most of the nation's history, such
use rested upon the common consent of local communities.' 7 While a
number of reported cases can be found in which aggrieved parties
brought challenges to such use on state law grounds,'" the first federal
constitutional challenge to such use was not adjudicated until 1959.
Thereafter, the Supreme Court developed a substantial body of case
law interpreting the first amendment's establishment clause and its ap-
plication to the states.'
A. The Establishment Clause: The Wall of Separation Between
Church and State
The clause against establishment of religion by law20 was in-
14. While this comment is restricted to the federal constitutional questions, attention is
drawn to the fact that numerous states have common law, statutory, or state constitutional
provisions governing the legality of permitting religious use of public school property, or
conditioning its use. See, e.g., Resnick v. East Brunswick Township Bd. of Educ., 77 N..
88, 96-100, 389 A.2d 944, 949-52 (1978). Thus, unless it is held that banning religious meet-
ings abridges students' federally protected rights to freedom of speech and association, free
exercise, or equal protection, states are free to fashion restrictions which effectively raise the
wall of separation between church and state higher than the establishment clause requires.
15. See infra notes 238-79 and accompanying text.
16. The phrase "religious meetings" as used herein means the voluntary use of public
high school or university property by a religious student group for religious purposes.
17. Annot., 79 A.L.R.2d 1148, 1150 (1959).
18. See C. ZOLLMAN, AMmuCAN CIVuL C-rRCH LAW 33-35 (1969).
19. The first case deciding federal constitutional questions in the context of use of public
school property by religious groups was Southside Estates Baptist Church v. Board of Trust-
ees, 115 So. 2d 697 (Fla. 1959) (holding the'temporary use of public school facility by reli-
gious congregation constitutional). The case arose twelve years after the Supreme Court's
first establishment clause case, Everson v. Board of Educ., 330 U.S. 1 (1947).
20. See supra note 7.
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tended, in the famous phrase of Thomas Jefferson, to erect "a wall of
separation between church and State."'" In deciding cases under this
provision, the Supreme Court has occasionally resolved the issues with
one eye on the historical significance of the religion clauses.22 How-
ever, since history discloses no clear meaning to the sparse provisions,2
the Court has chosen to "find" its own "historic principles."'24 Thus, in
Everson v. Board of Education , the first establishment clause case, the
Court stated that the clause prohibited more than government support
of an official state church:
The "establishment of religion" clause of the First
Amendment means at least this: Neither a state nor the Fed-
eral Government can set up a church. Neither can pass laws
which aid one religion, aid all religions, or prefer one religion
over another. . . No tax in any amount, large or small, can
be levied to support any religious activities or institutions,
whatever they may be called, or whatever form they may
21. Reynolds v. United States, 98 U.S. 145, 164 (1879). The phrase is an unfortunate
one because it implies that all governmental action can be neatly stacked on one side of the
wall or the other. Moreover, the metaphor is not infrequently offered as a substitute for
analysis. While one might well wish for its overdue demise, the phrase is so clearly a part of
the American vocabulary that it appears to be here to stay.
22. E.g., Everson v. Board of Educ., 330 U.S. 1, 8-14 (1947); id. at 33-43 (Rutledge, J.,
dissenting).
23. It is at least clear that the amendment was in part the result of religious persecution
during the colonial period, when the English Crown granted colonial charters in exchange
for the erection of the Anglican Church as the official, established religion and exacted taxes
in support of the church from colonists--regardless of individual personal beliefs. Id. at 9-
10. After the American Revolution state support of religion continued to flourish. Id. at 11.
James Madison published his well known Memorial and Remonstrance Against Religous 4s-
sessments (1785), reprintedin Walz v. Tax Comm'n, 397 U.S. 664, 719-27 (Douglas, J., dis-
senting), in which Madison warned of the evils accompanying state supported religion. Ad.
Having aroused sufficient public support, Jefferson and Madison successfully opposed the
taxing policy of the Virginia Legislature. Everson v. Board of Educ., 330 U.S. at 12. Even-
tually, Madison's efforts and influence in the First Congress produced the religion clauses of
the first amendment. Id. at 39.
However, many states maintained close ties with religion, and supposed that the
amendment was only a limitation on the power of the federal government, Barron v. Mayor
of Baltimore, 32 U.S. (7 Pet.) 243 (1833), thus arguably confirming state sovereignty over
religion. See generally C. ANTImAu, A. DowNEY & E. ROBERTS, FREEDOM FROM FEDERAL
ESTABLISHMENT (1964).
24. For example, the Supreme Court declared that in erecting the wall of separation, the
framers acted upon the belief "that a union of government and religion tends to destroy
government and to degrade religion. When government. . . allies itself with one particular
form of religion, the inevitable result is that it incurs the 'hatred, disrespect and even con-
tempt of those who hold contrary beliefs."' Abington School Dist. v. Schempp, 374 U.S.
203, 221-22 (1963) (citations omitted) (quoting Engel v. Vitale, 370 U.S. 421, 431 (1962)).
25. 330 U.S. 1 (1947).
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adopt to teach or practice religion. Neither a state nor the
Federal Government can, openly or secretly, participate in
the affairs of any religious organizations or groups and vice
versa.
26
Not all state action which provides benefits to religion is prohib-
ited by the establishment clause.27 In drawing the line between permis-
sible and impermissible benefits, the Court, in subsequent decisions,
declared that the principle governing state action under the establish-
ment clause is "neutrality": government must be neutral in its relations
with believers and nonbelievers.21 To measure state action against es-
tablishment clause prohibitions, the Court has evolved a tripartite test
which, as summarized in Lemon v. Kurtzman,29 purported to be a syn-
thesis drawn from criteria developed by earlier decisions. To pass mus-
ter, governmental action must (1) reflect a clearly secular purpose; (2)
have aprimary effect which neither advances nor inhibits religion; and
(3) not foster excessive governmental entanglement with religion.30
1. Secular purpose requirement
To satisfy the secularpurpose requirement of the Lemon test, gov-
ernmental action need only have an arguably secular design, as illus-
trated by the Supreme Court's "aid to parochial schools" cases.31 In
26. Id. at 15-16.
27. See generally Everson v. Board of Educ., 330 U.S. 1 (1947).
28. Eg., Roemer v. Board of Pub. Works, 426 U.S. 736, 745-46 (1976) (plurality opin-
ion); Abington School Dist. v. Schempp, 374 U.S. 203, 222 (1963). The Court is aware that
its decisions applying the neutrality principle are not easily reconcilable: "Of course, that
principle is more easily stated than applied." 426 U.S. at 747. "[C]andor compels the ac-
knowledgement that we can only dimly perceive the boundaries of permissible government
activity in this sensitive area of constitutional adjudication." Tilton v. Richardson, 403 U.S.
672, 678 (1971) (plurality opinion). It appears, in fact, that the Court has deliberately chosen
a flexible, ad hoe approach. See Walz v. Tax Comm'n, 397 U.S. 664, 669 (1970) ("The
course of constitutional neutrality in this area cannot be an absolutely straight line; rigidity
could well defeat the basic purpose of these provisions .. ").
At no time has a majority of the Court reached a clear consensus as to the boundaries of
the neutrality principle. Even within a single opinion the Court's more stridently anti-reli-
gious rhetoric may be difficult to reconcile with its conclusions. See generally Zorach v.
Clauson, 343 U.S. 306 (1952).
29. 403 U.S. 602 (1971) (invalidating state program involving payments to religious pri-
mary schools) (hereinafter referred to as the "Lemon test").
30. Id. at 612-13. The Court first announced the "secular purpose" and "primary effect"
tests in Abington School Dist v. Schempp, 374 U.S. 203, 222 (1963). In Walz v. Tax
Comm'n, 397 U.S. 664, 674 (1970), the Court added the "excessive entanglement" require-
ment. The Lemon test is not to be viewed as a precise formula, but as containing "guide-
lines" with which to identify instances when the neutrality objective of the establishment
clause has been compromised. Meek v. Pittenger, 421 U.S. 349, 358-59 (1975).
31. See Meek v. Pittenger, 421 U.S. 349 (1975) (furnishing of "auxiliary services" such
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these cases, the Court found secular purposes behind state programs
which provided a wide variety of materials and other assistance to stu-
dents in all private schools. Each program was explained to be a spe-
cies of general welfare legislation designed to benefit broad classes of
persons, among which were numbered religious schools. In view of the
broad meaning accorded this requirement, the first prong of the Lemon
test is seldom an issue in establishment clause cases.32
Nearly all of the reported cases which have applied the secularpur-
pose requirement to religious meetings have found secular purposes be-
hind state action making school facilities available to a broad class of
groups, of which religious groups were merely a part. Thus, permitting
Bible study clubs or prayer meetings on public high school campuses,
where such action is taken pursuant to a policy of permitting formation
and meetings of all student groups, has been held to have the secular
purpose of promoting student intellectual development and social and
cultural awareness. 3
3
2. Primary effect requirement
Governmental action which fosters a secular purpose may yet run
afoul of the second requirement of the Lemon test if it has a primary
as testing, counseling, speech and hearing therapy to children in private schools has secular
purpose of assuring that children have opportunity to develop intellectually and socially);
Lemon v. Kurtzman, 403 U.S. 602 (1971) (payment of salary supplements to private school
teachers-has secular purpose to promote education of children); Walz v. Tax Comn'n, 397
U.S. 664 (1970) (grant of property tax exemption to class composed of non-profit, quasi-
public entities such as hospitals, libraries, and patriotic groups, including church property
used solely for religious worship, has secular purpose to avoid inhibiting beneficial and sta-
bilizing influence of entities which foster the moral or mental improvement of community);
Board of Educ. v. Allen, 392 U.S. 236 (1968) (free loan of secular textbooks to all private
schoolchildren has secular purpose of promoting education of children); Everson v. Board of
Educ., 330 U.S. 1 (1947) (reimbursing parents for bus fare to transport their children to both
public and private schools, including sectarian schools, has private purpose of promoting
education of children).
32. But see Epperson v. Arkansas, 393 U.S. 97 (1968) (religious purpose found in law
making it unlawful for teachers in public schools to teach a theory of human biological
evolution); Abington School Dist. v. Schempp, 374 U.S. 203 (1963) (religious purpose found
in law requiring reading of ten verses from the Bible and recitation of the Lord's Prayer at
commencement of each school day).
33. Brandon v. Board of Educ., 635 F.2d 971 (2d Cir. 1980) (prayer meetings in unoccu-
pied school room prior to commencement of classes); Dittman v. Western Wash. Univ., No.
79-1189 (W.D. Wash. Feb. 28, 1980) (memorandum opinion) (permitting access to univer-
sity buildings for religious discussions), vacated as moo;, No. 80-3120 (9th Cir. Mar. 30,
1982); Johnson v. Huntington Beach Union High School Dist., 68 Cal. App. 3d 1, 137 Cal.
Rptr. 43, cert. denied, 434 U.S. 877 (1977) (certiorari denied on ground that petition was not
from final judgment). But see Trietley v. Board of Educ., 65 A.D.2d 1, 409 N.Y.S.2d 912
(1978) (religious purpose found in holding Bible study clubs on public high school campus).
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effect either of advancing or inhibiting religion. 4 The Supreme Court
has defined impermissible "advancement" as the "sponsorship,
financial support, and active involvement of the sovereign in religious
activity." 5 Thus, a finding of affirmative sponsorshio or ostensible en-
dorsement of religious activity, on the one hand, or directfnancialsu-
port in aid of religious activity, on the other hand, constitutes
impermissible advancement of religion.
a. affirmative sonsorship or ostensible endorsement
This comment will first consider what factors or elements lead to
the legal conclusion that government is affirmatively sponsoring or os-
tensibly endorsing religion, as distinguished from merely accommodat-
ing religion. Next, the religious meetings cases will be analyzed in light
of these standards.
i. elements of affirmative sponsorship and ostensible endorsement
That a public school may not directly sponsor religious activity
was first established in Illinois ex rel McCollum v. Board of Educa-
tion.36 In McCollum, the Supreme Court reviewed an Illinois program
in which religion teachers entered public school classrooms during the
school day once a week to provide religious instruction to pupils who
had voluntarily enrolled in religion classes. The religion teachers were
employed by private sectarian groups but reported to school authori-
ties.37 Students who did not enroll in religion were released to continue
their secular education in another part of the school.38 While the Court
employed no formal test to invalidate this so-called "released time"
program, it emphasized that the program involved the use of both tax
supported public buildings and state compulsory attendance laws. 9
34. See su.pra text accompanying note 30. The Supreme Court has cautioned that the
word "primary" should not be taken literally because inquiring into a hierarchy of effects
would involve the Court in impossible "metaphysical judgments." Committee For Pub.
Educ. & Religious Liberty v. Nyquist, 413 U.S. 756, 783-84 n.39 (1973). The Court declared
that "a law found to have a 'primary' effect to promote some legitimate end under the State's
police power is [not] immune from further examination to ascertain whether it also has the
direct and immediate effect of advancing religion." Id.
35. Walz v. Tax Comm'n, 397 U.S. 664, 668 (1970).
36. 333 U.S. 203 (1948).
37. Id. at 205.
38. Id. at 209.
39. Parents were required by law to send to school their six to sixteen year old children.
Id. at 205. The Court did not state precisely how compulsory attendance laws were coer-
cive, since attendance at the religious instruction sessions was not compelled; the opinion
merely noted that students who did not desire to participate were nevertheless compelled to
remain at school in some other area. Presumably, the evil was thought to be that the reli-
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Moreover, the program effected a union of religious groups and school
authorities in promoting religious instruction.40
The clearest case of affirmative sponsorship was presented by a
challenge to the New York public school system's Regent's Prayer in
Engel v. Vitale.41 In Engel, the New York Board of Regents had com-
posed an official "non-denominational" prayer42 which a local board of
education required to be recited daily in each class.43 The Supreme
Court declared that the establishment clause "must at least mean that
... it is no part of the business of government to compose official
prayers ... as a part of a religious program carried on by govern-
ment."" In'response to the argument that the prayer should be permit-
ted because it was denominationally neutral and recitation was
voluntary, the Court answered that "[w]hen the power, prestige and
financial support of government is placed behind a particular religious
belief the indirect coercive pressure upon religious minorities to con-
form to the prevailing officially approved religion is plain."
45
Finally, inAbington School District v. Schemp ,4 6 the Court struck
down Pennsylvania and Maryland statutes which required that each
school day commence with a reading, without comment, of verses from
the Bible.47 The exercises commenced with the reading of ten verses,
followed by a recitation of the Lord's Prayer, and closed with the flag
salute. The public school teacher had discretion to choose the passages,
gious program, in effect, came to the student, who bore the burden of removing himself from
its influence if he did not wish to participate. In such a situation the momentum of the
overall school program is placed behind the religious instruction, producing a subtle, coer-
cive effect. See infra text accompanying note 55.
40. 333 U.S. at 209-10.
41. 370 U.S. 421 (1962).
42. "Almighty God, we acknowledge our dependence upon Thee, and we beg Thy bless-
ings upon us, our parents, our teachers and our Country." Id. at 422. These state officials
published the prayer as part of their "Statement on Moral and Spiritual Training in the
Schools," stating: '"We believe that this statement will be subscribed to by all men and
women of good will, and we call upon all of them to aid in giving life to our program." Id.
at 423.
43. Id. at 422. The parents of ten pupils challenged both the state law authorizing the
school district to direct the use of prayer in public schools and the school district's regulation
ordering recitation of the particular prayer.
44. Id. at 425.
45. Id. at 43 1.
46. 374 U.S. 203 (1963).
47. The Pennsylvania statute, PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 24 § 15-1516 (Purdon 1949) (amended
1959), provided in part: "At least ten verses from the Holy Bible shall be read, without
comment, at the opening of each public school on each school day. Any child shall be
excused from such Bible reading, or attending such Bible reading, upon the written request
of his parent or guardian." 374 U.S. at 205. The Maryland statute, MD. ANN. CODE art. 77,
§ 202 (repealed 1978), prescribed similar opening exercises. 374 U.S. at 211-12.
1981]
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and students took turns reading aloud. In invalidating the programs,
the Court emphasized that the state was conducting a religious, devo-
tional ceremony.4" In addition, the exercises were "prescribed as part
of the curricular activities of students who are required by law to attend
school. They [were] held in the school buildings under the supervision
and with the participation of teachers employed in those schools."4 9
The fact that students could be released from the classroom was unper-
suasive. The Court, instead, was persuaded by the argument that if
students were constrained to leave the classroom to stand in the halls
during the observance, their peers might regard them as "odd balls" or
perceive them as being subject to punishment.50 The Court concluded
that the effect of these social pressures was subtle coercion to conform
to the officially "approved" religion.51
ii. accommodation to religion
In contrast, while the government may not constitutionally spon-
sor religious activities, it may accommodate student religious activities
conducted by or for students during the school day. In another "re-
leased time" case, Zorach v. Clauson,52 the Court upheld a voluntary
state program which permitted New York City public school teachers
to release students during the school day to report to nearby religious
centers for religious instruction or devotional exercises, and adjusted
the school schedule to accommodate those students. 3 The sponsoring
churches sent weekly reports to school authorities of children who had
not reported for instruction. 4
The majority distinguished the Zorach program from the McCol-
lum program on several grounds. First, the Zorach program took place
off school property, whereas the McCollum program turned public
school classrooms over to religion instructors as part of the formal
classroom curriculum. Under this circumstance, the instructors may
have appeared to students as endorsed by the state.5 5 Second, the Zo-
rach program required no expenditure of public funds, while the Mc-
48. 374 U.S. at 223.
49. Id.
50. Id. at 224-25.
51. Id. at 221. The courts assume that "coercion" plays some role in establishment
clause analysis dealing with ostensible endorsement. Traditionally, however, coercion is the
gist of a free exercise violation. See infra note 208.
52. 343 U.S. 306 (1952).
53. Id. at 314.
54. Id. at 308. A student was released to attend religious instruction on written request
of his parents. Those not released stayed in school.
55. Id. at 309.
[Vol. 15
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Collum program involved state purchase of Bibles and use of public
school teachers' time.56 Third, there was no evidence in Zorach that
compulsory attendance laws were invoked to assure attendance, di-
rectly or by subtle coercion, at the religious centers since "[n]o one is
forced to go to the religious classroom and no religious exercise or in-
struction is brought to the classrooms of the public schools."57 By con-
trast, the religious program in McCollum was brought to the student,
and the student needed to take affirmative steps to absent himself from
the room to avoid the program.58
The Zorach Court concluded that, while the principle of separa-
tion between church and state must remain absolute and unabridged,
the state may accommodate the religious needs of its citizens by adjust-
ing school schedules and releasing religious students. 9 The Court ex-
plained that the "neutrality" principle embodied in the establishment
clause may require accommodation in some circumstances:
We make room for as wide a variety of beliefs and creeds as
the spiritual needs of man deem necessary. . . .When the
state encourages religious instruction or cooperates with reli-
gious authorities by adjusting the schedule of public events to
sectarian needs, it follows the best of our traditions. For it
then respects the religious nature of our people and accommo-
dates the public service to their spiritual needs. To hold that
it may not would be to find in the Constitution a requirement
that the government show a callous indifference to religious
groups. That would be preferring those who believe in no
religion over those who do believe.6"
From the foregoing, the Supreme Court appears to take the posi-
tion that government has affirmatively sponsored or ostensibly en-
dorsed religion when one or more of the following elements are
present: 1 (1) the religious activity is initiated or conducted by govern-
56. Id.
57. Id. at 311. The Court rejected the argument that
the system involves the use of coercion to get public school students into religious
classrooms. There is no evidence in the record before us that supports that conclu-
sion. The record indeed tells us that the school authorities are neutral in this re-
gard and do no more than release students whose parents so request. If in fact
coercion were used, if it were established that any one or more teachers were using
their office to persuade or force students to take the religious instruction, a wholly
different case would be presented.
Id. (citations omitted).
58. Id. at 315.
59. Id. at 312, 315.
60. Id. at 313-14.
61. The United States Supreme Court has not expressly enumerated these criteria. Nor
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ment; (2) it is curricular in nature, i.e., it is either prescribed as part of
formal classroom instruction or inextricably blended with it; (3) it oc-
curs under circumstances which foster the appearance that government
stands behind or endorses the religious content; or (4) those students
not desiring to participate must take affirmative steps to remove them-
selves from the religious activity.
62
iii. religious meetings cases compared
A number of courts have concluded that state action permitting
religious student groups the use of classrooms during noninstructional
hours for voluntary religious meetings amounts to sponsorship of reli-
gion, in violation of theprimary effect requirement of the Lemon test.
In Johnson v. Huntington Beach Union High School District,63 a group
of students at a public high school sought to form a voluntary student
Bible study club and applied for the official recognition and approval
required to utilize classroom space during school hours.64 Although
the school had authority to recognize student clubs, long standing dis-
trict policy denied recognition to religious clubs.65 The students' appli-
cation to form the club was therefore denied.66
The California Court of Appeal, applying the tripartite Lemon
test, prohibited the district from recognizing the Bible study club on the
ground, inter alia, that the primary effect of recognition would be ad-
vancement of religion.67 The majority declared that what "most of-
fends establishment clause principles" was that "the consequence of
permitting the club to operate on campus as a recognized student or-
ganization is to place school support and sponsorship behind the reli-
has it used the terms "affirmative sponsorship" or "ostensible endorsement"; but the same
are reasonably deducible from the Court's decisions.
62. The first three criteria were formulated by the dissent in Johnson v. Huntington
Beach Union High School Dist., 68 Cal. App. 3d 1, 21-22, 137 Cal. Rptr. 43, 55-56 (McDan-
iel, J., dissenting), cert. denied, 434 U.S. 877 (1977).
63. 68 Cal. App. 3d 1, 137 Cal. Rptr. 43, cert. denied, 434 U.S. 877 (1977) (certiorari
denied on ground that petition was not from a final judgment).
64. Id. at 6, 137 Cal. Rptr. at 45. Status as a student club also entitled the group to
publicize its activities throughout the campus and in the school student newspaper. 1d. at 6
n.3, 137 Cal. Rptr. at 45 n.3.
65. Id. at 7, 137 Cal. Rptr. at 46. The district had briefly suspended its policy of prohib-
iting religious groups from meeting, but reinstated its long standing policy based on advice
from county counseL Counsel's opinion was subsequently supported by an official opinion
of the office'of the California Attorney GeneraL See 59 Op. CAL. Arr'y GEN. 214 (1976),
noted in Huntington Beach, 68 Cal. App. 3d at 7-8, 137 Cal. Rptr. at 46.
66. 68 Cal. App. 3d at 8, 137 Cal. Rptr. at 46.
67. Id. at 12-13, 137 Cal. Rptr. at 49-50.
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gious objectives of the club."68 It would have the fatal primary effect of
"implicat[ing] school authority and prestige behind the dissemination
of religious dogma."6 9 The court emphasized that high school students,
whose presence is compelled by law, may be "vulnerable to the pres-
sure of an officially recognized student religious organization."70
Similarly, in Brandon v. Board of Education,71 the Second Circuit
upheld a school board's action denying to a group of high school stu-
dents permission to use an unoccupied school classroom to conduct
voluntary prayer meetings prior to the commencement of school each
day.72 Applying the Lemon test, the court held that the use of public
school property would have the fatal primary effect of advancing reli-
gion by the appearance of ostensible state support for the dissemination
of religious doctrine.73 The Brandon court relied upon McColum74
and Zorach,75 noting the distinguishing feature of the permitted reli-
gious instruction in Zorach was that it was not held in the classroom,
whereas the condemned religious instruction in McCollum was,76 The
court also compared the case to Schemp 7 7 and Engel,78 both of which
involved teacher supervised prayer and Bible recitation.79
68. Id. at 13, 137 Cal. Rptr. at 50.
69. Id. at 16, 137 Cal. Rptr. at 51.
70. Id. at 15, 137 Cal. Rptr. at 51. A similar case was Trietley v. Board of Educ., 65
A.D.2d 1,409 N.Y.S. 912 (1978). There high school students, through their parents, brought
suit seeking to overturn a denial by a Buffalo, New York board of education of a request by
six high school students and a clergyman to form Bible study clubs in two Buffalo high
schools. Id. at 3-4, 409 N.Y.S. at 914. The court upheld the board action, holding that
"although there may be incidental secular benefits, the primary effect of the bible clubs is the
advancement of the religious philosophy contained in the bible." Id. at 7, 409 N.Y.S. at 916.
The court offered no analysis of the issues.
71. 635 F.2d 971 (2d Cir. 1980).
72. Id. at 973.
73. Id. at 978-79. The court explained:
Our nation's elementary and secondary schools play a unique role in transmit-
ting basic and fundamental values to our youth. To an impressionable student,
even the mere appearance of secular involvement in religious activities might indi-
cate that the state has placed its imprimatur on a particular religious creed. This
symbolic inference is too dangerous to permit. An adolescent may perceive "vol-
untary" school prayer in a different light if he were to see the captain of the
school's football team, the student body president, or the leading actress in a dra-
matic production participating in communal prayer meetings in the "captive audi-
ence" setting of a schooL
635 F.2d at 978 (citations omitted).
74. 333 U.S. 203 (1948); see supra notes 36-40 and accompanying text.
75. 343 U.S. 306 (1952); see supra notes 52-60 and accompanying text.
76. 635 F.2d at 978.
77. 374 U.S. 203 (1963); see supra notes 46-51 and accompanying text.
78. 370 U.S. 421 (1962); see supra notes 41-45 and accompanying text.
79. The Brandon court observed that the "degree of official support of religious activi-
ties" was greater in the Schempp and Engel cases. 635 F.2d at 979. In Brandon, there was
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In Dittman v. Western Washington University,8 ° a federal district
court upheld a state university policy restricting voluntary, student ini-
tiated religious meetings in campus buildings to no more than twice per
academic quarter and requiring that fair rental value be paid for each
use."' Nonreligious student groups were not subject to similar restric-
tions.82 The court held that that regular use of university facilities
would constitute an advancement of religion and have the "unavoida-
ble effect of placing the imprimatur of government upon the religious
activities being conducted in those facilities. 8 3
Many of the same arguments accepted by these courts were re-
jected by the Eighth Circuit in Chess v. Widmar. 4 In Chess, the court
reviewed a university policy permitting a recognized student religious
group to conduct weekly Saturday night meetings in an unused lecture
hall for informal sharing, prayer, Bible study and hymn singing, hold-
ing that this policy did not have the primary effect of advancing reli-
gion." The court stated:
Rather, it would have the primary effect of advancing the uni-
versity's admittedly secular purpose-to develop students'
"social and cultural awareness as well as [their] intellectual
curiosity." It would simply permit students to put their reli-
gious ideals and practices in competition with the ideas and
practices of other groups, religious or secular. It would no
more commit the University, its administration or its faculty
to religious goals than they are now committed to the goals of
the Students For a Democratic Society, the Young Socialists
Alliance, the Young Democrats or the Women's Union."
The court also noted that university students "rely more upon the cam-
pus as their total community," and can thus expect greater accommo-
dation to their religious needs.8 7
In evaluating the divergent conclusions reached by these courts
no evidence recited by the court that students who did not desire to participate were exposed
to the meetings, which were held before the formal "homeroom" period at 7:50 a.m. in an
unoccupied classroom and attended solely by students desiring to participate. Id.
80. No. 79-1189 (W.D. Wash. Feb. 28, 1980) (memorandum opinion), vacated as moot,
No. 80-3120 (9th Cir. Mar. 30, 1982).
81. Id. at 11.
82. Id. at 1.
83. Id. at 5 (citations omitted).
84. 635 F.2d 1310 (8th Cir. 1980), affd sub nom. Widmar v. Vincent, 102 S. Ct. 269
(1981); see infra notes 281-321 and accompanying text.
85. 635 F.2d at 1317.
86. Id.
87. Id. at 1320.
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some guidance can be found in the Supreme Court's decisions dealing
with sponsorship or ostensible endorsement.88 The first and apparently
chief element of sponsorship, initiation (conduct of religious activity by
school authorities, or a union of effort in promoting religion), seems to
be missing in the religious meetings context.89
The second factor relied upon by the Supreme Court, that the reli-
gious activity be prescribed as part of the normal daily curriculum, is
most notably lacking in this context. In each case, the proposed prayer
meetings or Bible studies were unmistakably separated from the school
curriculum because they were to be held before,90 after, or between
classes91 in separate rooms. The Huntington Beach court nevertheless
declared that even as an "implicitly extracurricular" activity, the pro-
posed Bible study would constitute sponsorship.92 That this was an ex-
tension of the Supreme Court's position was not noted by that court.
An additional element or factor emphasized by the Supreme
Court, which is missing in the religious meetings context, is that non-
participating students need take no affirmative steps to avoid the reli-
gious activity. The Court's concern, manifest in the high school setting,
is twofold: students may be a "captive audience," as a result of com-
pulsory attendance laws, and vulnerable to social pressure. The prob-
lem is best exemplified by McCollum, where reluctant but captive
students would have to dismiss themselves from ongoing religious ac-
tivity, thereby risking the ridicule accorded a "minority." 93 By con-
trast, in the religious meetings context, a willing student must
88. See supra text accompanying notes 61-62.
89. In each case the proposed club or meeting was independently conceived, organized
and conducted by students without the assistance of school employees. It is questionable
whether in the case of recognition of a religious group, existence of a faculty "sponsor" or
access to campus bulletin boards or to a student newspaper amounts to the active union of
efforts condemned in MeCollum. See supra text accompanying notes 36-40. The partner-
ship between religious authorities and school officials in McCollum could be characterized
as active, specifically directed to religious groups only, and unequivocally referable to pro-
motion of religion. In the religious meetings context, on the other hand, the act of allowing
access to campus communications media and the furnishing of a "sponsor, since the same
are available to all recognized groups," can be characterized as passive, nonspecific and
neutral. They have no unique applicability to religion. In addition, their effectiveness is
potential, not actual, being dependent upon students to make use of them.
90. E.g., Brandon v. Board of Educ., 635 F.2d 971 (2d Cir. 1980). Although the meet-
ings occurred prior to the commencement of classes, they were considered part of the school
day. Id. at 979.
91. Eg., Johnson v. Huntington Beach Union High School Dist., 68 Cal. App. 3d 1, 137
Cal. Rptr. 43, cert. denied, 434 U.S. 877 (1977) (certiorari denied on the ground that state
court judgment was not final).
92. Id. at 13, 137 Cal. Rptr. at 50.
93. See supra notes 36-40 and accompanying text.
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affirmatively discover the existence of the religious group, its time and
place of meeting, and actively seek it out. In short, the student "comes
to religion"; religion does not "come to the student.
'94
A more realistic basis for finding ostensible endorsement, as well
as coercion, involves the Supreme Court's fourth element: that the reli-
gious activity take place under circumstances which foster the appear-
ance of official endorsement. The circumstance that religious activity
occurs on public school property is occasionally regarded as determina-
tive. For example, the Brandon, Dittman, and Huntington Beach courts
noted that the forbidden released time program of McCollum v. Board
of Education95 took place in public school classrooms, while the ap-
proved program in Zorach v. Clauson96 took place off campus, whence
they concluded that the chief operative factor in assessing whether cir-
cumstances suggest ostensible endorsement is whether the activity is
held on school property.97
However, the situs of the activity factor was treated by the
Supreme Court as merely one factor to be considered. Other opinions
by individual Justices suggest that the Court's reference to "class-
rooms," as the situs of the condemned McCollum program, was meant
in the "curricular" rather than the "geographic" sense. Justice Brennan
rejected the geographic notion, explaining that "the deeper difference
was that the McCollum prayer placed the religious instructors in the
public school classroom in precisely the position of authority held by
the regular teachers of secular subjects, while the Zorach program did
94. See supra note 57 and accompanying text. Several courts have suggested that com-
pulsory attendance laws constitute a source of coercion and that this fact distinguishes high
school students from college students with regard to vulnerability to coercion. E.g., Chess v.
Widmar, 635 F.2d 1310 (8th Cir. 1980) (by implication), aff'dsub nom. Widmar v. Vincent,
102 S. Ct. 269 (1981); Brandon v. Board of Educ., 635 F.2d 971 (2d Cir..1980) (by implica-
tion). However, it is unclear what logical relevance the fact that students are required to
attend high school has to the degree of coercion; compulsory attendance laws render stu-
dents a captive audience, but not with respect to those activities to which they are not ex-
posed.
Outside the establishment clause, courts have held that high school students are not a
captive audience with respect to a faculty supervised student newspaper, containing objec-
tionable material, where students must affirmatively seek out and pick up the newspaper.
See infra note 104 and accompanying text. By analogy, where religious meetings are suM-
ciently discreet and a student must affirmatively seek them out, the "captive audience"
source of coercion appears an untenable argument, even in the high school setting. A differ-
ent situation might be present if the meetings are held in an area frequently traveled by all
students, such as a "commons" area or stadium.
95. See supra notes 36-40 and accompanying text.
96. See supra notes 52-60 and accompanying text.
97. See supra note 35 and accompanying text.
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not."1
9 8
To be sure, a religious teacher presumably commands sub-
stantial respect and merits attention in his own right. But the
Constitution does not permit that prestige and capacity for in-
fluence to be augmented by investiture of all the symbols of
authority at the command of the lay teacher for the enhance-
ment of secular instruction.99
Justice Brennan's interpretation in Schempp is reinforced by the views
of four other Justices, Frankfurter, Jackson, Rutledge, and Burton, who
joined in a concurring opinion in McCollum. These Justices explained
that "the whole school atmosphere and school planning is presumably
put behind religious instruction. . . precisely in order to secure for the
religious instruction such momentum and planning."
' °
It remains to be considered whether these courts, in extending the
Supreme Court's decisions, correctly concluded that a grant of permis-
sion to hold a religious activity in these circumstances constitutes af-
firmative sponsorship or ostensible endorsement. A number of cases
have recognized a distinction between college and high school students
based on the latter's presumed greater impressionability. 10' It might be
argued that high school students are led to believe that organized activ-
ities occur on c mpus only by grace of official "approval."' 2
On balance, fears of coercion to religion, born of a perception of
official endorsement and based on a mere grant of permission, may be
overstated. In other public school contexts outside of the establishment
clause, courts have held that not every activity which public schools
permit implies endorsement,0 3 even in the high school setting."
98. Abington School Dist. v. Schempp, 374 U.S. 203, 262 (1963) (Brennan, J.,
concurring).
99. Id. at 263.
100. 333 U.S. at 230 (Frankfurter, 3., concurring).
101. E.g., Chess v. Widmar, 635 F.2d 1310 (8th Cir. 1980), aff'd ub nor. Widmar v.
Vincent, 102 S. Ct. 269 (1981); Brandon v. Board of Educ., 635 F.2d at 978; Roemer v. Board
of Pub. Works, 426 U.S. 736, 750 (1976) ("College students are less susceptible to religious
indoctrination; college courses tend to entail an internal discipline that inherently limts the
opportunities for sectarian influence; and a high degree of academic freedom tends to pre-
vail at the college level."); see infra note 298.
102. It seems safe to assume that high school students are aware that because of their
relative immaturity, they and their activities are significantly controlled. A stronger argu-
ment could therefore be made that formal recognition as a school club goes too far.
103. The Fifth Circuit has held that a naked grant of permission does not imply endorse-
ment of a given activity. In Bazaar v. Fortune, 476 F.2d 570 (5th Cir.), reh'g en bane, 489
F.2d 225 (5th Cir. 1973), cert. denied, 416 U.S. 995 (1974), officials of a public university
sought to ban publication of short stories containing "four letter words" in a student publi-
cation on the theory that publication constituted "endorsement" of the articles by the uni-
1981]
LOYOLA OF LOS ANGELES LAW REVIEW [Vol. 15
Thus, a majority of courts which have ruled on the subject have taken
the position that a student staffed school newspaper is not so assimi-
lated into school curriculum or identifiable with the school as to justify
curtailing expression of arguably objectionable material on the theory
that publication would constitute endorsement by the school.°10
Most significantly, the religious meetings are typically only one of
many special interest groups or activities available to a student. The
multiplicity of alternatives would appear in most situations to dilute
any inference that the school endorses a particular group. For exam-
ple, the District of Columbia Circuit in OHair v. Andrus116 held that
where a public forum is made available to all groups, including reli-
gious groups, no "implied message" of government support is tele-
graphed; rather, the "message" is that government approves the
"principle of freedom of demonstration, for all groups, for all religions,
versity. 476 F.2d at 575. The Fifth Circuit dismissed the argument and denied the requested
relief, stating that "[tihe state is not necessarily the unrestrained master of what it creates
and fosters." Id.
104. The rule of Bazaar, see supra note 103, was followed in the high school context in
Gambino v. Fairfax County School Bd., 429 F. Supp. 731 (E.D. Va.), af'd, 564 F.2d 157
(4th Cir. 1977). There a school board asserted that allowing the student newspaper to print
an article containing information on contraceptives would effectively impose upon the stu-
dent body the views it contained, under the imprimatur of school authority. Id. at 735. The
board also argued that the rule of Bazaar is limited to the university context, in that compul-
sory attendance laws rendered the high school audience a captive one. The district court
rejected the board's argument and stated:
The defendants have asserted.. . that the subscription tie-in with the yearbook,
the distribution in home rooms, the official status of the newspaper, and peer pres-
sure, coupled with mandatory attendance all combine to compel the student body's
exposure to the contents of the [student newspaper]. The Court is not persuaded
that these circumstances establish [a] captive audience. . . . If anything, the stu-
dents ... are less captive because they must act affirmatively to pick up the
newspaper.
Id. at 736; accord Zucker v. Panitz, 299 F. Supp. 102 (S.D.N.Y. 1969) (high school).
105. See Trachtman v. Anker, 563 F.2d 512 (2d Cir. 1977); Nitzberg v. Parks, 525 F.2d
378 (4th Cir. 1975); Bayer v. Kinzler, 383 F. Supp. 1164 (E.D.N.Y. 1974).
Similarly, but in a different context, the Supreme Court further weakened the ostensible
endorsement argument. In Pruneyard Shopping Center v. Robins, 447 U.S. 74 (1980), the
Court upheld a state constitutional provision which permitted individuals to exercise free
speech and petition rights on the property of a privately owned shopping center. The Court
rejected the owner's argument that where the law requires permitting the use of the property
as a public forum, an implication would arise that the owner was endorsing the views of
such individuals. 447 U.S. at 87. The Court explained that the views expressed by the pub-
lic in passing out pamphlets "will not likely be identified with those of the owner." Id. In
addition, the owner "can expressly disavow any connection with the message by simply
posting signs in the area where the speakers or handbillers stand. Such signs, for example,
could disclaim any sponsorship of the message and could explain that the persons are com-
municating their own messages by virtue of state law." Id.
106. 613 F.2d 931 (D.C. Cir. 1979).
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even for those opposing religion."' 0 7
Other courts have rejected emphatically the notion that high
school students are so easily coerced or influenced as to warrant cur-
tailing exposure to a diversity of viewpoints. 08 Nor are such assump-
tions supported by the empirical findings of modern social
psychological research.10 9
b. direct financial aid
A second category of governmental action having the impermissi-
ble primary effect of advancing religion, in violation of the Lemon
test,1 0 is direct financial aid to religion."' The Supreme Court devel-
oped this category in the context of reviewing state subsidies to sectar-
ian schools and colleges 1 2 and has never considered the religious
meetings context.
Much of the controversy regarding financial benefits to religion
has involved judicial line drawing. It is clear that a direct subsidy to a
religious group, such as a church school, is prohibited by the establish-
ment clause." 3 If the prohibition against all financial benefits to reli-
gion were pressed to its logical extreme, however, government could
not constitutionally extend to religious groups the benefits of any ordi-
nary general welfare legislation because all governmental action has
107. Id. at 936; see infra text accompanying notes 294-96.
108. In Wilson v. Chancellor, 418 F. Supp. 1358 (D. Or. 1976), a federal district court
overturned a, school ban on political speeches. The court declared that the student audience
would not be converted overnight to communist ideology because "today's high school stu-
dents are surprisingly sophisticated, intelligent, and discerning. They are far from easy prey
for even the most forcefully expressed, cogent, and persuasive words." Id. at 1367-68.
109. The model of students as receptacles for propaganda, sometimes termed the "bullet
theory" of communications, assumes a passive audience. This model is today discredited.
Communication theory has moved in the last forty years "from the concept of a passive,
helpless audience to that of an obstinate, self-reliant active one," W. SCHRAMM, MEN,
MESSAGES, AND MEDIA: A LOOK AT HUMAN COMMUNICATION 246 (1973) (emphasis in
original), which tests messages against the norms of their personal reference group. See
generally E. KATz & P. LAZARSFELD, PERSONAL INFLUENCE (1964).
110. See supra text accompanying note 30.
111. See infra note 113.
112. See, e.g., Roemer v. Board of Pub. Works, 426 U.S. 736 (1976) (annual grants to
private colleges); Meek v. Pittenger, 421 U.S. 349 (1975) (furnishing free auxiliary services,
such as counseling and testing, to private elementary and secondary schools); Sloan v.
Lemon, 413 U.S. 825 (1973) (tuition grants to parents of private schoolchildren).
113. Committee For Pub. Educ. & Religious Liberty v. Nyquist, 413 U.S. 756 (1973). In
Nyquist, the Court invalidated a state program insofar as it provided direct money grants to
qualifying private schools in low income areas for repair and maintenance of their facilities,
purported to grant tuition reimbursement to parents of private schoolchildren, and provided
for tax relief to parents of such children. The Court found the aid "direct" where the class of
beneficiaries was composed almost entirely of Roman Catholic schools. Id. at 774.
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unavoidable incidental benefits which ripple throughout society.1 4
The Supreme Court drew a line in Everson v. Board of Educa-
tion." 5 A state program reimbursed parents of both public and sectar-
ian school children for bus fares expended in transporting their
children to school." 6 The objection was raised that part of the funds
went to transport children to Roman Catholic schools, thus constituting
an establishment of religion." 7 The Court admitted that the benefit
thereby conferred helped children get to sectarian schools, in the sense
that parents might not otherwise send their children to such schools
without free transportation." 8 But the same possibility existed that
parents might not send their children to church schools to which the
state had denied such basic services as police and fire protection, con-
nections for sewage disposal, and public highways and sidewalks.'1 9
The Court further stated:
Of course, cutting off church schools from these services, so
separate and so indisputably marked off from the religious
function, would make it far more difficult for the schools to
operate. But such is obviously not the purpose of the First
Amendment. That Amendment requires the state to be neu-
tral in its relations with groups of religious believers and non-
believers; it does not require the state to be their adversary.
20
Everson thus came to stand for the proposition that indirect eco-
nomic benefits, incidental to a general program providing secular and
neutral services to all students, do not have a primary religious ef-
fect.' 21 Later cases added the requirement that the nonsecular eco-
nomic effect also be "remote."' 22 These later cases applied the rule to
sustain governmental action providing neutral, incidental, indirect, and
114. The Supreme Court has never adopted the "strict neutrality theory," according to
which government could not classify in terms of religion either to confer a benefit or impose
a burden. See P. KURLAND, RELIGION AND THE LAW (1962). One commentator has ob-
served that the "no-aid" theory in its extreme form would require children "attending
churches preaching personal study of the Bible [to] be barred from the public schools so as
not to relieve these churches of the heavy financial burden of teaching their members to
read." Giannella, Religious Liberqy, Nonestablishment, and Doctrinal Development The
Nonestablishment Princile (Part II), 81 HARV. L. REv. 513, 568 (1968).
115. 330 U.S. 1 (1947).
116. Id. at 3.
117. Id. at 3-5.
118. Id. at 17.
119. Id.
120. Id. at 18.
121. See infra note 299 and accompanying text.
122. See Committee For Pub. Educ. & Religious Liberty v. Nyquist, 413 U.S. 756, 783-85
n. 39 (1973).
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remote-albeit substantial--economic benefits to religion. These bene-
fits included the free loaning of textbooks to all private school children
(including religious school children),'23 federal grants to institutions for
higher education (including church-related colleges), 2 4 granting of
property tax exemptions to church property used solely for religious
worship (where the exemption was granted to a broad class of property
owned by nonprofit, quasi-public corporations), 125 and providing to
private colleges (including church colleges) financing at bargain inter-
est rates.1
26
The use of tax supported school buildings by religious student
groups without charge, or at a rent below prevailing fair rental value,
arguably constitutes a financial benefit to religion. The authorities are
split regarding whether the benefit is properly to be classified as "di-
rect" or "indirect." The court in Johnson v. Huntington Beach Union
High School District,27 as an independent ground for condemning
under the establishment clause the proposed student Bible study club,
declared that if the club were permitted to meet on the school campus,
"state financial support would flow directly to the club."' 28 The
prohibited financial benefits identified by the court were rent-free use
of classroom space, free heat and light, a paid faculty sponsor, and
school district expense in meeting its statutorily imposed obligation to
audit club finances. 29  For authority, the court cited McCollum v.
Board of Education30 and Zorach v. Clauson13' and noted that the Zo-
rach Court had distinguished McCollum on the ground, inter alia, that
the condemned McCollum program involved free use of classrooms.'
32
The court in Brandon v. Board of Education 133 never discussed the
123. Board of Educ. v. Allen, 392 U.S. 236 (1968).
124. Tilton v. Richardson, 403 U.S. 672 (1971) (plurality opinion). The Court upheld
that portion of the act which conditioned receipt of funds for construction of buildings upon
covenants to restrict the use of the buildings for secular educational purposes, but invali-
dated that portion of the act which would, at the expiration of the twenty year covenants,
amount to an outright gift to the church related colleges of buildings for unrestricted reli-
gious use. Id. at 683-84.
125. Walz v. Tax Comm'n, 397 U.S. 664 (1970).
126. Hunt v. McNair, 413 U.S. 734 (1973).
127. 68 Cal. App. 3d 1, 137 Cal. Rptr. 43 (1977); see supra note 63.
128. 68 Cal. App. 3d at 12, 137 Cal. Rptr. at 49.
129. Id.
130. 333 U.S. 203 (1948); see supra notes 36-40 and accompanying text.
131. 343 U.S. 306 (1952); see supra notes 52-60 and accompanying text.
132. 68 Cal. App. 3d at 12, 137 Cal. Rptr. at 49.
133. 635 F.2d 971 (2d Cir. 1980).
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financial benefit issue. In Dittman v. Western Washington UniVersity,
13 4
a different type of financial benefit was condemned: as a recognized
university student group, religious students would be entitled to direct
payments of public funds. 3 '
On the other hand, the Eighth Circuit in Chess v. Widmar136 ana-
lyzed the economic benefits to a recognized university religious student
group resulting from the free use of an unused lecture hall for weekly
Saturday night prayer, fellowship, and religious study; the court held
the economic benefits to be indirect and incidental. 137 The primary
secular effect, to which the nonsecular economic benefits were said to
be incidental, was that of developing students' social and cultural
awareness and intellectual curiosity through formation and conduct of
extracurricular student clubs and interest groups. 38 The court ob-
served that religious groups were merely part of a broad class to which
the privilege of using campus facilities had been extended, viz., all rec-
ognized student groups.
139
The question here is whether free rent and utilities are a direct and
immediate economic benefit to religion, or an indirect, remote, and in-
cidental benefit. In deciding questions of this kind the Supreme Court
has looked to several factors. First, the Court implicitly has asked
whether the nonsecular effect is separable from the religious. Non-sep-
arability is generally established by showing that the particular form of
aid is neutral in character, having no unique adaptability to religious
purposes nor susceptibility to diversion to such purposes. 40 Thus, the
Court has upheld the furnishing of such neutral aid as buses,' 4 ' secular
books, 142 general governmental services such as police and fire protec-
tion and water services, 143 and certain health and remedial education
services.'" Viewed strictly from the economic benefit perspective,
"buildings" are not easily distinguished from buses or books. Neither
134. No. 79-1189 (W.D. Wash. Feb. 28, 1980) (memorandum opinion), vacated as moot,
No. 80-3120 (9th Cir. Mar. 30, 1982); see supra notes 80-84 and accompanying text.
135. No. 79-1189 at 1-2.
136. 635 F.2d 1310 (8th Cir. 1980), af§'d sub nom. Widmar v. Vincent, 102 S. Ct. 269
(1981); see supra notes 84-86 and accompanying text.
137. 635 F.2d at 1318-19.
138. Id.
139. Id.; see infra note 296.
140. L. TRIBE, AMERICAN CONSTITUTIONAL LAW § 14-9, at 840 (1978) [hereinafter cited
as TME].
141. See supra note 115.
142. See supra note 123.
143. See supra note 115.
144. See Wolman v. Walter, 433 U.S. 229 (1977). But aid to a "pervasively sectarian"
school poses the risk of having a direct and immediate effect of advancing religion; the state
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buildings nor free utilities have any unique adaptability to religious
purposes. For example, the secular effect of heat and light is to main-
tain a continuity of basic school functions for anyone using the class-
room-religious and nonreligious alike.14 5 It can therefore be argued
that such incidental aid to a student religious group is inseparable from
the secular effect of promoting student development.
Second, the Supreme Court has found economic benefits inciden-
tal where the class of beneficiaries is sufficiently broad. 146 It thus ap-
pears that the Chess court, in upholding the religious meetings there
involved, correctly relied on the fact that the student religious group
was one of many student interest groups permitted to use university
facilities as part of a broad policy of promoting and encouraging extra-
curricular student interest groups.'47 The Huntington Beach, Dittman,
and Brandon courts might be criticized for ignoring the fact that reli-
gious groups are also student groups, and that it is in their status as
students that the groups receive free rent and utilities. If, on the other
hand, religious groups were singled out for some peculiar advantage in
space assignment, or if a school reimbursed only a religious student
group for out of pocket expenses, such "aid" would more properly be
characterized as "direct" and "immediate."'
148
Finally, the Supreme Court has measured the nature and extent of
would in fact be paying for a sectarian education. See generally Hunt v. McNair, 413 U.S.
734, 743 (1973).
145. The argument that permitting religious meetings on public school property consti-
tutes a direct financial benefit to religion might be made as follows: public schools are tax
supported; religious meetings occur in tax supported buildings; therefore, the building is a
contribution of value from the public treasury in aid of religious teaching and a vehicle for
such teaching. There are several objections to this argument. First, a building is separable
from any religious effect because it has no religious significance. While a building might be
said to be a vehicle for religious activity, in the sense that it makes the very activity possible,
a bus is quite literally the "vehicle" which makes possible a religious education at a sectarian
school by transporting children to school-yet, the bus is permissible.
In addition, this argument seems to miss the point that where the financial benefit is
otherwise incidental and indirect, any remaining benefit does not have as its object or effect
the rendering of assistance to religious teaching, but merely the accommodation of the rights
of religious students to free exercise, association and access to a public forum. It is signifi-
cant that religious groups enjoy the right to equal access and use of tax supported public fora
such as streets, parks, and the National Mall, see infra note 235 and accompanying text;
O'Hair v. Andrus, 613 F.2d 931 (D.C. Cir. 1979) (upholding right of Roman Catholic Arch-
diocece publicly to celebrate Mass conducted by Pope John Paul II on National Mall in
Washington), but no establishment clause problem is thought to be present in these cases.
146. TRIBE, supra note 140, at 840; cf. Everson v. Board of Educ., 330 U.S. 1 (1947) (bus
transportation furnished to all schoolchildren, of whom religious children were only a part).
147. See supra notes 133-34 and accompanying text; see also infra note 299 and accompa-
nying text.
148. See supra note 113 and accompanying text.
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.the "aid" to religion.149 Condemned aid has been tangible, separable
and quantifiable, such as cash payments 50 and payments of sectarian
school teachers' salaries.1 5 1 Aid of this sort is a cost to the school which
it would not otherwise bear and is a benefit to religion which can be
instantly translated into religious propagation. The line between state
action and evangelism in such a case is straight and direct.
In marked contrast is the religious meetings context, where stu-
dents use existing facilities and benefit from heat and light which would
represent a constant cost to the school in any event, thereby involving
no separate state expenditure. The student group realizes a financial
benefit solely in the form of the savings of funds it might otherwise
have spent, funds which are freed to be devoted to religious ends. But
the Supreme Court has declined to characterize such a benefit as "aid,"
stating that "the Court has never accepted the recurrent argument that
all aid is forbidden because aid on one aspect of an institution frees it
to spend its resources on religious ends. .. .
c. pfmary effect revisited- the inhibition. of religion
The Supreme Court's tripartite Lemon test,' 53 designed to ensure
neutrality, admits of no inhibition of religion to the same extent that it
admits of no advancement. One of the few cases to find a violation of
the establishment clause based on a primary effect that inhibits religion
is Chess v. Widmar,154 in which the Eight Circuit held:
In contrast with a neutral policy [the University's] current reg-
ulation [prohibiting religious meetings in campus facilities]
has the primary effect of inhibiting religion, an effect which
violates the Establishment Clause just as does governmental
advancement of religion. . . . The University's policy sin-
gles out and stigmatizes certain religious activity and, in con-
sequence, discredits religious groups.'55
The evidence in Chess showed that the prohibition against reli-
gious meetings on campus imposed severe disabilities on the student
149. "'The problem, like many problems in constitutional law, is one of degree.'" Meek
v. Pittenger, 421 U.S. 349, 359 (1975) (quoting Zorach v. Clauson, 343 U.S. 306, 314 (1952)).
150. Levitt v. Committee For Pub. Educ., 413 U.S. 472 (1973) (holding invalid lump sum
per pupil payment to all private schools to cover cost of services mandated by state law).
151. Lemon v. Kurtzman, 403 U.S. 602 (1971).
152. Hunt v. McNair, 413 U.S. 734, 743 (1973).
153. See supra text accompanying note 30.
154. 635 F.2d 1310 (8th Cir. 1980), af'd sub nom. Widmar v. Vincent, 102 S. Ct. 269
(1981); see.infra notes 281-321 and accompanying text.
155. 635 F.2d at 1317.
Vol. 15
8ELIGIOUS MEETINGS
group which had sought to hold weekly Saturday night meetings in an
unused lecture hall. As a consequence of being forced to meet off cam-
pus, the group suffered a loss of visibility and identity as a campus
organization. 56 Chess thus implicitly stands for the proposition that
where the elements of an establishment clause violation are not other-
wise present, imposing disabilities on religious groups amounts to a
prohibited inhibition of religion.
The problem is that the terms "advancement" and "inhibition" are
legal conclusions, not self-applying tests. The courts that ruled that
permitting religious meetings advanced religion believed that it was
necessary for the state, in effect, to inhibit religion in order to avoid
advancing it. The important unanswered question is whether "ad-
vancement" and "inhibition" are merely ffip sides of the same coin, i.e.,
whether every disability imposed on a religious activity unnecessary to
avoid an advancement is an inhibition, or whether, instead, a court
should weigh the degree of inhibition imposed against the degree of
advancement to be avoided.
It is suggested that the Supreme Court has intended the latter anal-
ysis in its proscription against either inhibition or advancement of reli-
gion. This would seem to follow from the principle that a judicial
opinion, like a statute, should be given an interpretation which will
render its words reasonable; any other interpretation here would render
the test a mere tautology. In addition, the Court has indicated that
where an advancement of religion is merely arguable, theoretical or
speculative, but the inhibition is severe and palpable, it is the inhibition
which controls. In McDaniel v. Pay,157 a plurality of the Court struck
down a state provision barring ministers from political office.15 The
justification asserted by the state was prevention of an establishment
clause violation, viz., avoiding injection of sectarian concerns into the
lawmaking process and fomentation of religious strife.15 9 While no
member of the Court accepted the argument, Justices Brennan and
Marshall stated in a separate opinion that they would have based the
decision, in part, on the establishment clause. According to these Jus-
tices, exclusion of ministers in order to avoid an establishment clause
violation
itself raises the question whether the exclusion violates the Es-
tablishment Clause. As construed, the exclusion manifests
156. Id. at 1317 & n.9. A member of the religious group stated in an affidavit filed with
the district court: "Having to explain that we have to meet off campus tends to make stu-
dents think that there is something "wrong" with us and that there is something wrong with
religion since it has been banished from the campus." Id.
157. 435 U.S. 618 (1978) (plurality opinion).
158. Id. at 629.
159. Id. at 628.
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patent hostility toward, not neutrality respecting, religion;
forces or influences a minister or priest to abandon his minis-
try as the price of public office; and, in sum, has a primary
effect which inhibits religion.
60
It might thus be argued that any "advancement" flowing from the pas-
sive act of permitting private, voluntary religious meetings is theoreti-
cal in many cases-particularly in university settings-and is
outweighed by both the inhibition of religion flowing from exclusion
from the campus and the concomitant curtailment of the arguably pro-
tected first amendment rights of speech, expression and association.' 6'
3. Entanglement with religion
The third requirement of the Lemon test provides that governmen-
tal action must not foster an "excessive governmental entanglement
with religion."' 62 The no-entanglement requirement has been used
both as a basis for prohibiting certain aid to religion' 63 and as a justifi-
cation for permitting certain benefits which might otherwise constitute
an impermissible advancement of religion.1' 4
Entanglement may be of two types, administrative or political.
The first has arisen where government aid to certain schools, particu-
larly "pervasively sectarian" elementary or secondary schools, is pecu-
liarly susceptible to diversion to religious uses. To ensure that no aid is
put to religious purposes, government would need to involve itself in an
intrusive and day-to-day administrative program of monitoring school
affairs; therefore, aid itself is prohibited.' 65 The second type, political
entanglement, arises where governmental action carries a risk of divi-
sive political conflict along religious lines; therefore, the action itself is
prohibited. 66 The no-political-entanglement requirement has served
chiefly to invalidate continuing grant programs. Such programs assure
160. Id. at 636 (footnote omitted).
161. See infra text accompanying notes 213-30.
162. See supra text accompanying note 30.
163. See, e.g., Levitt v. Committee For Pub. Educ., 413 U.S. 472, 481-82 (1973).
164. See, e.g., Hunt v. McNair, 413 U.S. 734, 741-46 (1973).
165. In its prohibitive form the requirement has been applied almost exclusively in the
context of aid to private schools, invalidating aid to those institutions which are so "perva-
sively sectarian" that it would be necessary for the state to monitor the schcol to ensure that
public funds are not spent on religious propagation. See Meek v. Pittenger, 421 U.S. 349
(1975); Hunt v. McNair, 413 U.S. 734 (1973).
166. Lemon v. Kurtzman, 403 U.S. 602, 622-24 (1971). The "political divisiveness" arm
of the no-entanglement principle was first introduced, apparently without conscious inten-
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periodic reconsideration at renewal time and thereby present the pros-
pect for repeated political confrontation among members of the
public.167
Courts have used both entanglement principles to invalidate reli-
gious meetings conducted on the public campus. The court in Johnson
v. Huntington Beach Union High School District161 found excessive ad-
ministrative entanglement in provisions of state law requiring a faculty
sponsor to attend all club functions and the school to audit clubs'
financial accounts and review membership procedures to ensure that
they were not secret or discriminatory.1 69 In addition, the court found
a potential for divisiveness by hypothesizing the possibility that stu-
dents representing less orthodox religions might be unable to organize
a club because of insufficient student support or inability to procure a
faculty sponsor, together with the possibility of competition among
outside sects who may vie for permission to operate on campus.
1 70
Similarly, the court in Brandon v. Board of Education1 71 found a
risk of excessive administrative entanglement from continuing surveil-
lance of proposed prayer meetings, which the court assumed would be
required to guarantee that participation would remain strictly volun-
tary.1 72 The court also assumed that official supervision would be re-
quired to ensure the smooth functioning of the school's secular
schedule and the maintenance of the school's safety and order.
1 73
The basis for the notion that monitoring a religious student group
for the neutral purpose of assuring school security and personal safety
poses a risk of excessive entanglement is not articulated by these courts
and appears to lack authority. The extent of state involvement with
religion in this context appears to fall within the ambit of permissible
accommodation outlined by the Zorach Court. 174 There, the school
district maintained responsibility for religious students while they at-
tended off-campus religious meetings and while church officials took
attendance and sent school officials regular reports.17  Church and
school officials maintained a close liaison for the purpose of coordinat-
tion to carve out a new doctrine, by Justice Harlan in Board of Educ. v. Allen, 392 U.S. 236,
249 (1968) (Harlan, J., concurring).
167. 403 U.S. at 622-24.
168. 68 Cal. App. 3d 1, 137 Cal. Rptr. 43, cert. denied, 434 U.S. 877 (1977).
169. Id. at 13-14, 137 Cal. Rptr. at 50.
170. Id.
171. 635 F.2d 971 (2d Cir. 1980).
172. Id. at 979.
173. Id.
174. 343 U.S. 306 (1952); see supra notes 52-60 and accompanying text.
175. 343 U.S. at 308.
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ing schedules.176 Other courts have found that auditing and monitor-
ing procedures were largelyproforma acts of a ministerial nature and
therefore not excessive. 
177
Monitoring to assure that students are not coerced to attend reli-
gion classes presents a closer question. The Zorach Court, in approv-
ing the released time program, had noted the lack of evidence of
coercion.17 Since substantial first amendment rights are at stake, the
Court's command that states employ the least burdensome means to
achieve their legitimate objectives arguably requires that curtailment of
religious meetings ought to await proof of actual coercion, or at least a
strong probability of such coercion.1
79
The second concern of the no-entanglement requirement, avoiding
political division along religious lines, requires assessing the
probability that such campus activities will engender community polit-
ical battles. A student club recognition policy or classroom allocation
policy which favors certain religious groups over others risks commu-
nity dissension. At the other extreme, one court determined that where
space is assigned on a first-come-first-served basis, so as to eliminate
both the appearance and reality of administrative discretion, the pros-
pect of religious strife resulting from processing applications of rival
religious groups for limited space is "imaginary.'
80
What if students representing less orthodox religions are unable to
form a group due to inability to garner sufficient support? The Hunt-
ington Beach court, in expressing concern about this possibility, failed
to clarify that it is not student debate about religion which the no-polit-
ical-entanglement requirement seeks to avoid, but the explicitlypolit-
ical representation of such conflict among members of the community
through the political process."" The university is insulated from polit-
ical conflict over religion by (1) its unique status as a "marketplace of
ideas,"'182 (2) its greater distance from local control, and (3) the relative
176. Id. at 315.
177. Resnick v. East Brunswick Township Bd. of Educ., 77 N.J. 88, 116, 389 A.2d 944,
958 (1978).
178. See supra text accompanying note 57.
179. See infra notes 238-79 and accompanying text.
180. 77 NJ. at 116, 389 A.2d at 958.
181. See supra text accompanying note 30.
182. The Supreme Court has observed that colleges and universities are peculiarly the
archetypal "marketplace of ideas." Healy v. James, 408 U.S. 169, 180 (1972). The Court has
sanctioned greater aid to sectarian colleges and universities than would be acceptable to
secondary schools, based on the belief that the hearty secular atmosphere of colleges and
universities and the public perception of such institutions tend to focus debate on educa-
tional and fiscal matters without provoking strong emotion about religion. See generally
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maturity of its students. On the other hand, the high school is an im-
perfect marketplace 183 and local communities take a more direct hand
in its affairs;' 84 the possibility of religious strife may therefore be corre-
spondingly greater.
However, if community religious groups are likely to take their
grievances over school affairs to the political arena,185 it is not clear
how banning religious student groups will resolve the possibility of reli-
gious strife. The courts do not appear to have considered the equally
plausible hypothesis that such action is reasonably calculated to\gener-
ate even more animosity and result only in shifting the grievances to
other grounds.186 Thus, banning religious meetings to avoid political
divisiveness may be worse than simplistic; it may well be counter-
productive.
The no-political-entanglement requirement was developed by the
Supreme Court in the aid to public schools context. 187 There are indi-
cations that where speech and associational activity are implicated, the
Court would not countenance application of the principle merely to
prevent political divisiveness along religious lines.1
88
Roemer v. Board of Pub. Works, 426 U.S. 736 (1976) (plurality opinion); Hunt v. McNair,
413 U.S. 734 (1973); Tilton v. Richardson, 403 U.S. 672 (1971) (plurality opinion). The
character of the institution benefited is thus one of the three factors formally considered by
the Court in evaluating whether excessive entanglement exists as a result of aid to sectarian
institutions. The other two factors are the nature of the aid provided and the resulting rela-
tionship between government and church authorities. 426 U.S. at 748 (citing Lemon v.
Kurtzman, 403 U.S. 602, 615 (1971)). Because no actual aid is involved in a religious meet-
ings case, this test seems inapplicable.
183. See supra note 103 and accompanying text.
184. The historic tradition of local control of education is maintained by local school
board elections.
185. The methods of bringing local pressure to bear on educators can be easily imagined:
complaints to school administrators and boards of education, letter writing campaigns, pro-
test movements, or recall elections.
186. Even the prospect of banning religious meetings from high school campuses com-
monly provokes immense controversy and turmoil, as religious students and religious com-
munity groups organize to press their demands for freedom to assemble on campus. One
example furnishes a case study. When California's Saddleback Valley Unified School Dis-
trict considered ordering religious student groups to cease their lunch hour meetings on the
district's two high school campuses, on advice of counsel that the meetings were unconstitu-
tional, a battery of approximately one hundred community religious and lay leaders, stu-
dents and their families jammed publicly held board meetings and carried their grievances
to the newspapers in a bitter controversy which continues at this writing. Los Angeles Times
(Orange County ed.), March 11, 1981, § II at 1, col. 1.
187. See supra note 112.
188. In McDaniel v. Paty, 435 U.S. 618 (1978), the Court invalidated'a state law which
disqualified members of the clergy from holding political office. The state's proffered justifi-
cation for the exclusion was its alleged interest in avoiding sectarian strife. Id. at 628-29.
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Turning to the permissive form' 8 9 of the no-entanglement require-
ment, the Eighth Circuit in Chess v. Widmar' 90 employed this aspect of
the Lemon test to strike down a university prohibition on religious
groups' use of public university buildings. If there is a danger of entan-
glement associated with religious students' use of such buildings, the
court stated, there is a deeper danger of entanglement associated with
scrutinizing applications by religious students with a different eye than
those by nonreligious students.191 The court believed that "[t]he Uni-
versity's prohibition on worship and religious teaching also hopelessly
entangles it in the delicate tasks of defining religion, determining
whether a proposed event involves religious worship or teaching, and
then monitoring events to ensure that no prohibited activity takes
place." 92 The notion that entanglement is often a trade-off, and that
some entanglement with religion may be justified on the rationale that
the cure may be worse than the disease, has been recognized by the
Supreme Court.
93
Finding a suitable constitutional definition of "religion" has long
fascinated the commentators. 194 But the operational difficulty of defin-
While a majority of the Court was unable to agree on a rationale, Justice Brennan, in a
concurring opinion joined by Justice Marshall, stated:
The State's goal of preventing sectarian bickering and strife may not be ac-
complished by regulating religious speech and political association. The Establish-
ment Clause does not license government to treat religion and those who teach or
practice it, simply by virtue of their status as such, as subversive of American ideals
and therefore subject to unique disabilities.
Id. at 641 (Brennan, J., concurring).
189. See supra note 164 and accompanying text.
190. 635 F.2d 1310 (8th Cir. 1980), aff'dsub nom. Widmar v. Vincent, 102 S. Ct. 269
(1981); see supra notes 84-89 and accompanying text; see also infra notes 281-321 and ac-
companying text.
191. 635 F.2d at 1317-18.
192. Id. at 1318. The court noted that the task of defining religion is aggravated by the
broadening definition of religion in contemporary society. Id. at 1318 n. 10.
193. In Walz v. Tax Comm'n, 397 U.S. 664 (1970), the Court held that while a grant of
exemption of church property used solely for religious worship from property taxes gave rise
to some state involvement in religious affairs-as well as indirect economic savings-such
involvement was justified on the basis that the alternative, taxation of church property, gave
rise to even greater involvement through procedures of tax valuation, tax liens, tax foreclo-
sures, "and the direct confrontations and conflicts that follow in the train of those legal
processes." Id. at 674.
194. Generally, the commentators call for a narrow definition of religion for purposes of
the establishment clause because no real danger is posed to freedom of religion by govern-
ment aid to unconventional religious groups. On the other hand, commentators call for a
wider definition of religion for purposes of the free exercise clause because the latter seeks
only to vindicate individual liberty rather than to overturn social welfare programs. See J.
NoWAK, R. ROTUNDA, & . YoUNG, CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 878 (1978). For a general dis-
cassion of religious freedom in the public schools, see Pfeffer, The Supremacy of Free Exer-
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ing and identifying instances of uniquely religious activity is perhaps
nowhere better illustrated than in the religious meetings cases. 195
Doubtless much of the activity at such meetings is protected speech and
association. This raises several troubling questions. When does an ab-
stract discussion of personal, subjective experience become "religious"?
Is the test "sincerity of belief," and, if so, how is this ascertained? Will
the state or school district include on its books finespun expositions of
specific doctrinal positions and theological abstractions? When does a
discussion of sacred texts pass from "cultural" or "historical" to "reli-
gious"? Does a common invocation opening a meeting constitute "reli-
gious worship" or a prescribed ritual, though the rest of the meeting be
devoted to secular finances? Any test which might be devised carries
three fatal risks: (1) administrative discretion might be exercised arbi-
trarily; (2) a prohibition may sweep within its net much protected
speech and association; and (3) student groups which survive the test
would be the object of constant surveillance to ferret out religious ac-
tivity with a resulting chill on protected speech.
B. Rights To Free Exercise of Religion
196
Most cases challenging a public school policy prohibiting religious
student meetings on school property have included a claim that the pol-
icy violates the right to free exercise of religion. In analyzing the right
cise, 61 GEO. L.J 1115 (1973) [hereinafter cited as Pfeffer]; Kurland, The Supreme Court,
Compulsory Education, and the First Amendment '! Religion Clauses, 75 W. VA. L. REv. 213
(1973).
195. An example of the difficulty of defining religion at the operational level can be found
in the procedures of the defendant university in Dittman v. Western Wash. Univ., No. 79-
1189 (W.D. Wash. Feb. 28, 1980) (memorandum opinion), vacated as moot, No. 80-3120
(9th Cir. Mar. 30, 1982). Under university procedure, requests for space were made to a
university administrator who determined whether the proposed activity was religious in na-
ture under the following definition: "Religious worship, exercise, or instruction [including]
activity intended to propagate or support any particular doctrine of [sic] belief, or any activ-
ity which is a prescribed ritual of any religion." Id. at 7-8. If the administrator is unable to
determine whether the activity is religious, he or she inquires further, if still uncertain, he or
she requires the requesting group to sign a form representing that religious activity will not
take place. Id. at 8. If the applicant refuses to sign the form, space is denied. Id. In
Dittman, the district court rejected plaintiffs' contentions that this definition was constitu-
tionally vague, and held that the phrase "religious activity" is of sufficient definiteness to
enable a reasonably prudent person to know what is intended in the definition and what is
not. Id. at 9. The court did not consider whether the task of administering the definition
excessively entangled the university with religion in violation of the establishment clause.
For a recent case in which the Supreme Court acknowledged the impossibility of distin-
guishing religious worship qua speech from ordinary speech, see infra notes 285, 301 and
accompanying text.
196. See infra notes 309-13 and accompanying text.
1981]
LOYOLA OF LOS ANGELES LAW REVIEW
to free exercise of religion, the Supreme Court has employed a balanc-
ing test. A plaintiff must show a substantial burden on the exercise of a
sincerely held religious belief. Such a burden will be justified only if
the law is necessary to promote a compelling state interest and is the
least restrictive means available.
197
Only one court has accepted a religious student group's free exer-
cise claim. The Delaware Supreme Court in Keegan v. University of
Delaware'"8 held that a state university policy denying students the
right to use university dormitory "commons" areas for religious wor-
ship, where the university permitted students an otherwise free use of
the areas, burdened religious students' free exercise rights and that the
state had not demonstrated a compelling state interest.199 When ad-
dressing the free exercise claims of religious student groups in the reli-
gious meetings context, the approach of most courts has either been to
find that the alleged infringement was insubstantial,2°° or that the prac-
tice of holding religious meetings during the school day was not a mat-
ter of deep religious conviction2°0 or, even assuming that infringement
was established, that the state's interest in separating church and state
or preventing establishment clause violations was compelling. 2
If it is assumed that a state's interest in preventing establishment
clause violations is legitimate, it would seem that a ban on religious
student meetings on public school property is not a sufficiently "sub-
stantiar' coercion of religious belief or practice to support a cognizable
claim. As the Brandon court observed, students at all times remain free
to believe and, at least during nonschool time, free to practice their
beliefs off campus.203 However, two obvious concerns have not been
recognized by the religious meetings cases, which are taken up in Part
197. See Wisconsin v. Yoder, 406 U.S. 205 (1972) (law requiring members of Amish
Church to send their children to public or private school beyond the eighth grade impermis-
sibly burdened free exercise of religion, where central tenet of belief was nonexposure to
secular society); Sherbert v. Verner, 374 U.S. 398 (1963) (denial of unemployment benefits to
Sabbatarian because she refused to work on Saturday due to religious beliefs held violative
of free exercise clause).
198. 349 A.2d 14 (Del. 1975), cert. denied, 424 U.S. 934 (1976).
199. Id. at 19.
200. Brandon v. Board of Educ., 635 F.2d 971, 976-77 (2d Cir. 1980).
201. Chess v. Widmar, 480 F. Supp. 907, 917 (W.D. Mo. 1979), rev'd, 635 F.2d 1310 (8th
Cir. 1980), aff'dsub non Widmar v. Vincent, 102 S. Ct. 269 (1981); see infra notes 281-321
and accompanying text.
202. Dittman v. Western Wash. Univ., No. 79-1189 (W.D. Wash. Feb. 28, 1980) (memo-
randum opinion), vacated as moot, No. 80-3120 (9th Cir. Mar. 30, 1982); Johnson v. Hunt-
ington Beach Union High School Dist., 68 Cal. App. 3d 1, 16-17, 137 Cal. Rptr. 43, 52, cert.
denied, 434 U.S. 877 (1977).
203. 635 F.2d at 980.
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III of this comment: first, the interplay and tension between the accom-
modation arguably compelled (though perhaps not clearly compelled)
by the free exercise clause, and that arguably limitedby the establish-
ment clause; and second, whether the means chosen to avoid an estab-
lishment of religion are the least restrictive available.
2
0
4
An interesting question is whether the free exercise clause might
be invoked to establish the per se invalidity of a rule banning religious
meetings from public schools. It might be argued that a denial of ac-
cess to vacant classrooms based solely on a group's "religious" status
operates directly against the student in the nature of a penalty. At least
two members of the Supreme Court have indicated that they might
adopt such a position.2°5
An argument that occasionally is made is that students' rights to
the free exercise of religion are infringed when they attempt to rally
support to hold meetings or to form a religious student club, but fail-
perhaps because they represent a less orthodox religion or perhaps sim-
ply because they are inartful advocates. It is argued that the unsuccess-
ful student subjectively experiences his or her religion as "rejected" and
is thus "coerced" to conform to the "prevailing" religion.20 6 This argu-
ment appears to be the establishment clause "ostensible endorsement"
argument20 7 redressed in a free exercise gown.
20 8
One way of posing the issue is to ask how far the state must go to
protect the sensibilities of students in its charge. In the establishment
clause portion of this comment, it is suggested that the Supreme Court's
204. The Supreme Court has observed that there exists a tension between the establish-
ment clause and the free exercise clause. See Engel v. Vitale, 370 U.S. 421, 430 (1962)
("these two clauses may in certain circumstances overlap"); see infra note 272.
205. Justice Brennan, in a concurring opinion joined by Justice Marshall in McDaniel v.
Paty, 435 U.S. 618 (1978) (plurality opinion), stated that he would base his condemnation of
a state statute which excluded ministers from political office on the ground that the statute
penalized the free exercise of religion by "establishing a religious classification as a basis for
qualification for a political office" and was therefore per se invalid. Id. at 634-37 & n.8
(Brennan, J., concurring).
206. The Huntington Beach court speculated that such students may be unable to form a
religious club "because of insufficient student support or unavailability of a faculty sponsor.
In such event, the free exercise rights of the minority might well be infringed by the pressure
upon them to conform to the beliefs of the recognized religious club." 68 Cal. App. 3d at 14,
137 Cal. Rptr. at 50-51.
207. See supra text accompanying notes 61-62.
208. In fact, the problem of coercion of students, even that resulting from ostensible state
endorsement of religion, is more appropriately analyzed in terms of interference with the
right to free exercise of religion, because it is the office of the free exercise clause to guaran-
tee against coercion. Engel v. Vitale, 370 U.S. 421, 430 (1962) ('The Establishment Clause,
unlike the Free Exercise Clause, does not depend upon any showing of direct governmental
compulsion. .... ).
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answer is that the state is constitutionally compelled to protect the sen-
sibilities of students to the extent that the state can be held responsible
for creating the impression of sponsorship or ostensible endorsement of
the religious content of student groups.20 9 Absent a finding of ostensi-
ble endorsement or sponsorship, and assuming a pristine laissezfaire
school policy, injured sensibilities resulting from an unsuccessful at-
tempt to mobilize student support to form a religious student group
appear indistinguishable from those arising from everyday life which
the religious student might experience in any instance of religious sales-
manship, as, for example, where a religious biology student argues in
class for "scientific creationism 210 and is met with studied indiffer-
ence.21 1 The common element linking both situations is that the causal
relationship between state action "permitting" the religious speech and
the hurt sensibilities is either nonexistent, or so attenuated and remote
as to render untenable the argument that the state "caused" the alleged
coercion.
C. Freedom of Speech, Association and Equal Protection
First amendment protection of speech, expression and association
"apparently" extends to religious speech, expression and association
with the same force and vigor as it does to political or other modes of
individual expression. The qualification "apparently" seems necessary
because the Supreme Court has never directly held as much.212 In-
stead, in vindicating first amendment claims to free speech, the Court
has attached no independent significance to the fact that the speech in
question was religiously motivated.
In a prodigious line of cases dealing with religious canvassing and
solicitation, the Court has consistently held that the dissemination of
209. See supra text accompanying notes 61-62.
210. "Scientific creationism" is the theory that the origin of biological life was the one
time creative act of an all powerful God, as distinct from the theory of human biological
evolution.
211. Examples can be multiplied. During a recess or school lunch period a religious stu-
dent exhorts a few peers to adopt his or her religious principles and is cooly rebuffed. Or, in
a controversial classroom discussion, a religious student volunteers his or her input and, for
authority, cites to a sacred text. In response, he or she is greeted with hostility. On the other
hand, another religious student presses claims for his or her religion and is warmly received.
In each case the school has "permitted" the activity. But if the school can be said to have
"coerced" any student, it is difficult to see how this logic can be contained short of barring
all religiously motivated speech from the public school campus.
212. For a recent Supreme Court decision which held that religious and nonreligious
speech do not differ in principle in the first amendment context, see Widmar v. Vincent, 102
S. Ct. 269 (1981); see infra note 285 and accompanying text.
[Vol. 15
1981] RELIGIO US MEETINGS
religious information and the distribution of religious literature consti-
tute protected activity.2"3 Similarly, in the context of licensing schemes
regulating the time, place or mainer of speech in public places, the
Court has extended to religious speech the protections of the doctrines
of prior restraint21 4 and constitutional vagueness.2 15 However, because
the Court has never squarely been confronted with a case where the
free speech and establishment clauses arguably conflict,21 6 it is unclear
whether, or to what extent, religious speech must yield to the establish-
ment clause. This section sets forth the applicability of first amend-
ment guarantees in the schools.
1. The first amendment in the public schools
Tinker v. Des Moines Independent School District
217 is the seminal
Supreme Court decision dealing with application of first amendment
freedoms in the public schools. In Tinker, the Court held that first
amendment rights apply with the same force in the public school as in
the community at large.218 In a well known phrase, Justice Fortas,
213. See Village of Schaumburg v. Citizens For a Better Env't, 444 U.S. 620 (1980); Mur-
dock v. Pennsylvania, 319 U.S. 105 (1943) (plurality opinion); Jamison v. Texas, 318 U.S.
413 (1943); Largent v. Texas, 318 U.S. 418 (1943); Cantwell v. Connecticut, 310 U.S. 296
(1940); Schneider v. State, 308 U.S. 147 (1939).
214. A prior restraint on speech is censorship prior to publication or a condition on
speech unless it has the approval of a government official. As a system of inhibiting danger-
ous or irresponsible speech, it is the alternative to a system of subsequent punishment. Be-
cause of the preferred position of the first amendment, and because prior restraints pose the
greatest danger of preventing speech altogether, prior restraints have been particularly disfa-
vored. See Near v. Minnesota, 283 U.S. 697, 713-16 (1931); see infra text accompanying
notes 288-91.
In Murdock v. Pennsylvania, 319 U.S. 105 (1943) (plurality opinion), the Court over-
turned convictions of certain Jehovah's Witnesses who had violated an ordinance by selling
books without paying a license tax, holding that dissemination of religious literature consti-
tuted activity protected by the first amendment. 319 U.S. at 117. In Kunz v. New York, 340
U.S. 290 (1951), the Court reversed a conviction of a Baptist minister for violating an ordi-
nance which prohibited holding a religious meeting on streets without a permit, on the
ground that the ordinance was an invalid prior restraint on first amendment speech. Id. at
293. The clearest and most recent pronouncement by the Court indicating that the full range
of first amendment protection extends to religiously motivated speech came in Village of
Schaumburg, where the Court held that charitable solicitation for funds and religious evan-
gelisim and canvassing are entitled to coequal first amendment status. 444 U.S. at 632.
215. See Hynes v. Mayor of Oradell, 425 U.S. 610 (1976).
216. But see infra notes 281-321 and accompanying text.
217. 393 U.S. 503 (1969) (upholding right of junior and senior high school students to
wear armbands in protest to Vietnam War on school campus despite school ban,.where the
act constituted symbolic speech).
218. Id. at 506. Indeed, the Court has recognized that the "vigilant protection of constitu-
tional freedoms is nowhere more vital than in the community of American schools."
Shelton v. Tucker, 364 U.S. 479, 487 (1960); see also Papish v. Board of Curators, 410 U.S.
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speaking for the Court, stated that "[i]t can hardly be argued that either
students or teachers shed their constitutional rights to freedom of
speech or expression at the schoolhouse gate."219 In another decision,
the Court observed that protection of these freedoms is particularly im-
portant in the university and college setting, which is peculiarly the
"marketplace of ideas."" 0 However, Justice Fortas in Tinker noted
that first amendment rights must be applied "in light of the special
characteristics of the school environment." 22' Thus, schools may re-
strict speech if they are able to sustain their burden of proving that the
activity will result in substantial interference with school discipline or
interfere with the constitutional rights of others.
222
First amendment protection also encompasses freedom to associ-
ate to advance one's personal beliefs.223 This principle was applied to
the university context in Healy v. James,224 where university students
formed a chapter of the Students for a Democratic Society (S.D.S.) and
sought recognition as a campus group. Administration officials denied
the group recognition because they found its objectives disagreeable
and because the S.D.S. parent body had a reputation for disruptive-
ness. 2 5 The Court held that the.university had not carried its burden
of demonstrating that permitting such speech and association would
result in substantial interference with school discipline or with the con-
stitutional rights of others.226
The Healy Court stated that "[tihere can be no doubt that denial
of official recognition, without justification, to college organizations
burdens or abridges that associational right. The primary impediment
to free association flowing from nonrecognition is the denial of use of
campus facilities for meetings and other appropriate purposes."227 De-
nial of access to campus bulletin boards and the school newspaper fur-
ther circumscribed the right of association in that to "remain a viable
667, 671 (1973) (no "dual standard" to be applied in scrutinizing restrictions on speech);
Wright, 7he Constitution On the Campus, 22 VAND. L. REv. 1027 (1969); see infra text ac-
companying notes 281-321.
219. 393 U.S. at 506.
220. Healy v. James, 408 U.S. 169, 180 (1972) (citing Keyishian v. Board of Regents, 385
U.S. 589, 603 (1967)); see infra notes 223-30 and accompanying text.
221. 393 U.S. at 506.
222. Id. at 508-09.
223. NAACP v. Button, 371 U.S. 415 (1963) (invalidating state statute which would have
disbarred attorneys who represented organizations with no pecuniary interest in the litiga-
tion; statute aimed at disabling civil rights attorneys).
224. 408 U.S. 169 (1972).
225. Id. at 174-76 & n.4.
226. Id. at 190-91.
227. Id. at 181.
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entity in a campus community in which new students enter on a regular
basis, it must possess the means of communicating with these stu-
dents." '228 Nonrecognition, the Court reasoned, denied the group the
ability to "participate in the intellectual give and take of campus de-
bate."229 Thus, the fact that the group could still meet off campus did
not dilute the significant disabilities imposed by nonrecognition. z3 °
2. The public forum and the right to equal access
If permitting religious speech on the public campus would consti-
tute an establishment of religion, it might be argued that a policy of
discrimination against religious speech is precisely what the establish-
ment clause compels. Uncompromising adherence to this position,
however, invites more difficulties: a broad based prohibition on pro-
tected speech, based on its content, violates both the right to freedom of
speech and to equal protection of the laws.23' In Police Department of
Chicago v. Mosley, 32 the Supreme Court held that a city ordinance
which prohibited all peaceful labor picketing within 150 feet of schools
from thirty minutes before commencement of the.school day to thirty
minutes after conclusion, constituted a burden on fundamental first
amendment rights of free speech. The Court stated that absent a com-
pelling state interest, this ordinance amounted to a denial of free speech
as well as equal protection in violation of the fourteenth amendment.
The Court set forth the fundamental principle:
There is an "equality of status in the field of ideas," and gov-
ernment must afford all points of view an equal opportunity
to be heard. Once a forum is opened up to assembly or speak-
ing by some groups, government may not prohibit others from
assembling or speaking on the basis of what they intend to
say. Selective exclusions from a public forum may not be
based on content alone, and may not be justified by reference
to content alone.3
The concept of the public forum, a well settled constitutional doc-
trine,234 thus states a broad rule of equality of access to public and
semi-public fora. Speech, association and expression may be regulated -
228. Id.
229. Id. at 181-82.
230. Id. at 182-83.
231. See infra notes 232-37 and accompanying text; see also infra notes 281-321 and ac-
companying text.
232. 408 U.S. 92 (1972).
233. Id. at 96.
234. TRmE, supra note 140, at 21; T. EMERSON, THE SYSTEM OF FREEDOM OF ExPREs-
1981]
LOYOLA OF LOS ANGELES LAWR EVIEW [Vol. 15
only as to time, place, or manner and by criteria unrelated to con-
tent.235 The Supreme Court has long condemned discriminatory allo-
cation of public fora to religious groups. 36 The doctrine has been held
to apply in the public school and university setting by so many cases
that its applicability in this context now appears to be beyond ques-
tion,237 though its precise contours may be uncertain.
III. STANDARD OF REVIEW: BALANCING CONFLICTING RIGHTS
In view of the foregoing authorities, religious groups are able to
present a formidable prima facie case of infringement of their first
amendment liberties. Nonreligious high school and university students
clearly enjoy first amendment rights to freedom of speech and associa-
tion on the public campus, which are abridged by denial of access to
school facilities or by nonrecognition. 8  In addition, discriminatory
allocation of school facilities on the basis of the content of speech de-
SiON 303-04, 305-07 (1970); Kalven, The Concept f the Public Forum: Cox v. Loulsiana,
1965 Sup. CT. Rnv. 1, 29-30 (1965).
235. Linmark Assocs. v. Township of WiUingboro, 431 U.S, 85 (1977) (ordinance ban-
ning "for sale" and "sold" signs to reduce white flight from racially integrated town held
invalid regulation of content of speech).
236. In Niemotko v. Maryland, 340 U.S. 268 (1951), the Court held that a city could not,
consistently with the equal protection clause, deny to Jehovah's Witnesses the use of a city
park for Bible talks because the city found the Witnesses disagreeable, where the city had
permitted the park to be used for "meetings and celebrations" by other community, political
and religious groups, such as a Flag Day ceremony of the Order of Elks. Id. at 269, 272-73.
The Court followed Niemotko two years later in Fowler v. Rhode Island, 345 U.S. 67 (1953).
There the Court invalidated an ordinance which had been construed to apply so as to pro-
hibit a group of Jehovah's Witnesses from holding religious services in the park, though
other religious groups had been permitted use of the park. Id. at 69-70; see infra note 285.
237. See, e.g., Healy v. James, 408 U.S. 169, 192-93 (1972) ("Just as in the community at
large, reasonable regulations with respect to the time, the place, and the manner in which
student groups conduct their speech-related activities must be respected."); Gay Students
Org. of the Univ. of N.H. v. Bonner, 509 F.2d 652, 658 (1st Cir. 1974); University of S. Miss.
Chapter of the Miss. Civil Liberties Union v. University of S. Miss., 452 F.2d 564, 566 (5th
Cir. 1971); Lawrence Univ. Bicentennial Comm'n v. City of Appleton, 409 F. Supp. 1319,
1326 (E.D. Wis. 1976); Local 1880, Am. Fed'n of Teachers v. Florida Bd. of Regents, 355 F.
Supp. 594, 596 (N.D. Fla. 1973); Brooks v. Auburn Univ., 296 F. Supp. 188, 192 (N.D. Ala.
1969).
A typical illustration of the public forum concept as applied in the public school is
found in Lawrence University. There a district court held that defendant school board's
denial of students' application to rent a high school gymnasium for a speech by Angela
Davis, a controversial celebrity, pursuant to a board regulation prohibiting use for religious
or political activities unless the activity is nonpartison or nondenominational, was a per se
violation of first amendment rights because it regulated speech on the basis of content. 409
F. Supp. at 1323. In addition, denial was held to violate the equal protection clause under
the rule of Mosley, since the board had allowed other groups to use the gym as a public
forum but had denied it to plaintiffs to censor the group's ideas. Id. at 1324.
238. See supra notes 213-30 and accompanying text.
RELIGIO US MEETINGS
nies freedom of speech and equal protection.239 If religious speech is
equated with political or other nonreligious speech, religious groups
may argue, accommodation to permit religious meetings on campus is
compelled. Yet the establishment clause, in certain circumstances, ar-
guably compels a different result.
There would appear to be no escape from attempting some recon-
ciliation of these apparently conflicting constitutional commands. Sur-
prisingly, however, the courts have offered no systematic analysis
which recognizes, the need for such reconciliation. Some courts omit
reference to any first amendment rights and seek guidance from estab-
lishment clause cases dealing with aid to parochial schools. 24 0 Other
courts assume first amendment rights do not apply.24' Still other courts
assume that the establishment clause does not apply.242
One area of tension is the conflict between the establishment
clause and the public forum doctrine.243 The Eighth Circuit in Chess v.
Widmar24 applied the doctrine in the context of religious meetings in
public university facilities, holding that the defendant university may
not deny access to facilities on the basis of the religious content of the
student group's speech.245 However, the court had no occasion to con-
sider how to reconcile the two constitutional commands since it found
no establishment of religion.2  The court appeared to assume that
government could never be guilty of an establishment of religion when
it allocates access to a public forum on an even handed basis.2 47
239. See supra note 231 and accompanying text.
240. E.g., Johnson v. Huntington Beach Union High School Dist., 68 Cal. App. 3d 1, 137
Cal. Rptr. 43, cert. denied, 434 U.S. 877 (1977).
241. See infra notes 248-51 and accompanying text.
242. See infra notes 244-47 and accompanying text.
243. See supra notes 231-37 and accompanying text.
244. 635 F.2d 1310 (8th Cir. 1980), aff'd sub nom. Widmar v. Vincent, 102 S. Ct. 269
(1981); see in/ra notes 281-321 and accompanying text.
245. 635 F.2d at 1315-16.
246. .d. at 1317.
247. This argument has some support. In O'Hair v. Andrus, 613 F.2d 931 (D.C. Cir.
1979), the court held that where a public forum, viz, the National Mall in Washington, is
allocated on a nondiscriminatory basis to religious and nonreligious groups alike, no estab-
lishment clause problem arises either from the standpoint of financial benefits or ostensible
endorsement. Id. at 936-37. Furthermore, while the Supreme Court has consistently upheld
the rights of religious groups to use public fora such as streets and parks, the Court has never
suggested that use by such groups constitutes an establishment. See supra note 236 and
accompanying text. Arguably, therefore, where the public forum doctrine applies, there can
be no establishment of religion.
The Supreme Court has not yet applied the public forum doctrine in the public schools
in any religion context. But see infra notes 281-321 and accompanying text. Indeed, the
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The Second Circuit in Brandon v. Board of Education24 also
avoided reconciling the two by taking a converse, but equally absolu-
tist, approach to the relationship between the public forum doctrine
and the establishment clause. The court found an establishment of reli-
gion but held that a high school is not a public forum,24 9 thereby draw-
ing in question once again the applicability of the public forum
doctrine in public schools. The court stated that while the facilities of a
university have been held to be a public forum, a high school classroom
is not, noting the greater risk of an establishment clause violation.
25 0
This conclusion appeared to be contrary to the weight of authority.
251
Both the Chess and Brandon courts avoided a conflict between the
establishment clause and the public forum doctrine by taking the abso-
lutist position that either one or the other applies, but never both.252
This expedient analysis was achieved at the expense of failing to recog-
nize that elements of both may coexist in the same case: the high
school has certain features of a public forum, although permitting reli-
gious speech may constitute a potential establishment of religion under
Andrus court itself cautioned that different considerations might apply in a public school
setting due to the unique susceptibility of children to coercion. 613 F.2d at 936.
248. 635 F.2d 971 (2d Cir. 1980).
249. Id. at 980.
250. Id. In justifying its conclusion that a high school is not a public forum, the court
refered to "sensitive Establishment Clause considerations" which limit students' rights to air
religious doctrine. Id. Presumably, the court was referring to greater relative youth and
impressionability of high school age students. The court, therefore, left unclear whether it
meant that high schools are not public fora for any purpose, or only for purposes of religious
speech.
251. See supra note 236 and accompanying text.
252. Some courts have argued that the public forum cases are inapposite in the religious
meetings context, by observing that the classical situs for application of the rule of equal
access has been public streets and parks. See, e.g., Chess v. Widmar, 480 F. Supp. 907
(W.D. Mo. 1979), rev'd, 635 F.2d 1310 (8th Cir. 1980), aj'd sub nom. Widmar v. Vincent,
102 S. Ct. 269 (1981); see infra notes 281-321 and accompanying text.
Clearly, access to streets and parks, because of their obvious suitability for public ex-
pression, has been the object of special protection by the Supreme Court. See Saia v. New
York, 334 U.S. 558, 561 (1948), for discussion of the significance of public streets and parks.
By contrast, expression in public schools is subject to more ambitious regulation as to time,
place and manner of expression in order not to cause disruption of educational activity or
conflicts in assigned space. See infra text accompanying notes 253-54.
Clearly there is no constitutional right to school facilities on demand. See Poulous v.
New Hampshire, 345 U.S. 395, 405 (1953). Religious groups have no more claim to facilities
not otherwise available for general use than any other campus group, especially when such
use would interfere with the school day., Stein v. Oshinsky, 348 F.2d 999, 1001 (2d Cir.
1965). But the same is true of streets and parks, access to which is usually conditioned by
local authorities on obtaining a proper permit. The inquiry in both contexts, therefore, is
not the nature of the forum as such, but the validity of the prior restraint. See supra note 210
and accompanying text.
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certain circumstances. The traditional approach has been to recognize
that public facilities, including high schools, are at least semi-public
fora where speech is subject only to reasonable time, place or manner
regulations, but where characteristics unique to the facility may be
taken into account in adjudging the reasonableness of such regula-
tions35 3 One commentator summarized the special manner in which
courts have applied the public forum doctrine in the public facilities
context:
Public facilities like schools and libraries, created not prima-
rily for public interchange but for purposes closely linked to
expression, have been treated as semi-public forums, with
government enjoying power to preserve such tranquility as
the facilities' central purpose requires-a power that would be
denied in a true public forum-but no power to exclude
peaceful speech or assembly compatible with that purpose.254
One approach which might obtain for religious student groups
maximum enjoyment of first amendment rights, while avoiding an es-
tablishment problem, would be to vest in school administrators author-
ity to prescribe reasonable restrictions on the time, place or manner of
admittedly 5 5 religious activities-closely tailored to achieving the im-
portant interest in avoiding an establishment of religion and unrelated
to content. One of the factors which may be considered in determining
the reasonableness of such restrictions is the special insulation public
schools enjoy from religious coercion. 56 The restrictions, however,
may impose no disability beyond that strictly necessary to avoid an
establishment of religion. Under this view, a categorical ban on reli-
gious meetings would be directly related to content, and hence invalid;
but more limited restrictions related to the neutral and special charac-
teristics of the audience, such as its peculiar susceptibility to coercion,
would be valid, with more ambitious restrictions permissible in the
253. See Tinker, 393 U.S. at 506 (first amendment rights must be applied "in light of the
special characteristics of the... environment"); see also supra note 252.
254. TRIBE, supra note 140, at 690.
255. Student groups which do not concede the religious character of their proposed activ-
ity would compel the school to engage in the difficult and entangling task of defining reli-
gion. See supra text accompanying notes 189-95.
256. In fashioning restrictions on a case by case basis to avoid the ostensible endorsement
of religion, schools might limit admittedly religious groups to meeting only during lunch
periods or before and after class periods in unoccupied facilities, removed from nonpartici-
pating students. In addition, nonstudent religious representatives, such as clergypersons and
church leaders, might be denied access to the campus to restrain their participation in the
student religious group's activities.
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high school than in the university setting.25 7
A second area of tension concerns the relationship between the
establishment clause and direct burdens on speech, association, and
free exercise interests. In the religious meetings cases, the courts have
struggled to fit the square peg of free speech and equal protection doc-
trines into the round hole of the establishment clause. In Dittman v.
Western Washington University,258 the court conceded that the permit
system at issue259 did "unquestionably constitute a prior restraint.
260
To justify the restraint, the court searched for a "clear and present dan-
ger which the University has the right to prevent."261 The court then
identified the feared evil as a violation of the establishment clause, and
held that the state had a "compelling interest" in preventing regular use
of its facilities for religious purposes to avoid a violation of the estab-
lishment clause.262 Likewise, the court in Brandon v. Board of Educa-
tion263 held that the school board's refusal to permit high school
students to conduct prayer meetings on campus prior to commence-
ment of classes did not violate the students' rights to freedom of speech,
association or religion because avoiding an establishment of religion
257. The difficulty with time, place and manner restrictions on religious meetings is that,
unless nonreligious student groups are subject to similar disabilities, it is hard to escape the
conclusion that such regulations thinly disguise regulation by religious content. It is argua-
ble whether such restrictions are a classification by content or by type. Religious speech
might be viewed as sui generis, a special category of speech, in the way that commercial
speech was traditionally viewed. See Valentine v. Chrestensen, 316 U.S. 52 (1942). How-
ever, the Supreme Court has not only declined to carve out a special category of "religious
speech," but has exhibited a trend to abandon nice distinctions between categories of pro-
tected speech. See Virginia State Bd. of Pharmacy v. Virginia Citizens Council, Inc., 425
U.S. 748 (1976) (rejecting doctrine that "commercial speech" is outside of first amendment
protection-though commercial speech may be regulated in ways not appropriate for "core"
first amendment speech). In short, a more forthright approach for reconciling the establish-
ment clause with the public forum doctrine seems to be called for. See infra notes 274-79
and accompanying text. For a discussion of the Supreme Court's most recent analysis of
religious speech, see infra note 285 and accompanying text.
258. No. 79-1189 (W.D. Wash., Feb. 28, 1980), vacated as moot, No. 80-3210 (9th Cir.
Mar. 30, 1982).
259. See supra note 195.
260. No. 79-1189, slip op. at 8.
261. Id.
262. Id.
The Dittman court explained its view of the relationship between the establishment
clause and freedom of speech and association: "Religious expression cannot, however, be
completely equated with political expression.. . . Distinctions based upon the religious
nature of speech are permissible if government accommodation to religious speech violates
the Establishment Clause. . . ." Id. at 3.
263. 635 F.2d 971 (2d Cir. 1980).
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furnished the state with a compelling interest.2
The notion that prevention of an establishment of religion is a le-
gitimate and compelling state interest, which can lay a predicate for
curtailment of speech, association, and free exercise activity, is novel.
The idea seems so simple and straight a path out of the dark conceptual
forest that it no doubt appeared to these hapless courts-which were
charting new paths Without the compass of precise precedents-as the
answer to all prayers.265
The idea is not without its problems, however. The Supreme
Court had occasion to consider whether avoidance of an establishment
of religion is a legitimate state interest in McDaniel v. Paty,266 but
found the question unnecessary to decide.267 The issue therefore awaits
final decision by the Supreme Court.268 In the interim, the Court has
declared that the proper grounds for curtailment of expression and as-
sociation rights on the public school campus are the likelihood of cam-
pus unrest or invasion of rights of other students26 9 -not prevention of
264. Id. at 978.
These courts appear to have assumed that the establishment clause marks the outer
boundary of speech and association freedom. It is noteworthy that the Dittman court, only a
few lines before its announcement that religious expression cannot be equated with political
expression, see supra note 262, acknowledged that "religious speech is to be afforded the
same protections afforded political speech." No. 79-1189, slip op. at 3 (citation omitted). It
is difficult to know what to make of these statements, other than that these courts take the
position that all other liberties must yield to the establishment clause. It is clear that, in so
holding, they take away with one hand the very equality of status which they have given
religious speech with the other.
265. The analogy to a "compelling state interest," borrowed from "strict scrutiny" analy-
sis, furnished a convenient handle. Under established doctrine, state action burdening exer-
cise of fundamental rights must be supported by a governmental interest which can be
termed "compelling" and must be the least burdensome means to achieve the objective. See
Shapiro v. Thompson, 394 U.S. 618, 634 (1969) (durational residency requirements burden-
ing fundamental right to travel); Sherbert v. Verner, 374 U.S. 398, 406 (1963) (withholding
unemployment compensation benefits from Sabbatarian unwilling to work on Saturday bur-
dening fundamental right to free exercise of religion); Skinner v. Oklahoma, 316 U.S. 535,
541 (1942) (statute authorizing mandatory sterilization of certain convicts burdening funda-
mental right to procreation).
266. 435 U.S. 618 (1978).
267. Id. at 628. It had been argued that such an interest justified infringement of a minis-
ter's rights to free exercise of religion incident to an exclusion of the clergy from state polit-
ical offices. The plurality invalidated the statute on the ground that the evil which the state
had sought to avoid, injection of partisan religious strife into the political process, was imag-
inary in any event. Id. at 628-29.
268. For a recent Supreme Court decision adopting the compelling state interest test in
the religious meetings context, see Widmar v. Vincent, 102 S. Ct. 269 (1980); see infra note
291 and accompanying text.
269. Tinker v. Des Moines Indep. School Dist., 393 U.S. 503, 508-09 (1969); see supra
note 222 and accompanying text.
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establishment clause violations. In no religious meetings case was there
evidence that permitting student religious meetings was likely to lead to
disorder or invasion of other students' rights.
Whatever currency such an interest may have as a justification for
excluding church schools from government subsidies, a quite different
situation arises where fundamental rights are at stake 2 70 especially
where the proffered interest is no ordinary objective of government, but
is itself a fundamental right expressly guaranteed by the Constitu-
tion.27' In short, fundamental rights are being pitted against one
another.
The question before a court in a religious meetings case is to define
the rights of all students. Under the Dittman and Brandon analyses,
rights to freedom of speech, association and free exercise must always
yield to an establishment clause violation. Now one must agree that if
the establishment clause is violated, exercise of such rights must cease.
But one can know that the establishment clause is violated only if he or
she first knows that in a contest between the establishment clause and
any other constitutional guarantee, the establishment clause always
wins. However, the courts do not explain by what criteria they make
this value judgment;272 in fact, they are arguing in a circle. Thus, the
270. It is arguable that such a state interest provides a rational basis for differential treat-
ment of public and private schools with respect to receipt of state largesse; the private reli-
gious school has no independent claim to public benefits. See Luetkemeyer v. Kaufmann,
364 F. Supp. 376 (W.D. Mo. 1973), af'dper cur/am, 419 U.S. 888 (1974). By contrast, in the
religious meetings context, religious students have fundamental rights to freedom of speech
and association. The theory that a state may assert and promote an interest which consists
of separating church and state further than required by the establishment clause suggests
that a state is free to override, as a matter of state law, federal constitutional guarantees. It
was settled early, however, that a state law is of no effect where it conflicts with the United
States Constitution. McCulloch v. Maryland, 17 U.S. (4 Wheat.) 316 (1819); see infra note
294.
271. Freedom from a state establishment of religion has been held to be a fundamental
right. See authorities cited supra note 9.
272. There is good reason to question the desirability of elevating the establishment
clause to so preeminent a position in the hierarchy of constitutional iights. The commenta-
tors interpret the Supreme Court's freedom of religion cases to stand for the proposition that
where conflict between the free exercise clause and the establishment clause exists, the free
exercise clause should be dominant. See TRIBE, supra note 140, at 833-34. For example, a
state must modify its unemployment compensation requirement that potential beneficiaries
be willing to work on Saturdays in order to accommodate the needs of those who are relig-
iously opposed to work on Saturdays, but willing to work on Sundays instead. Sherbert v.
Verner, 374 U.S. 398 (1963). Though arguably the state is thereby establishing a religion of
Sabbatarianism, "only an illusory and hostile neutrality would be achieved by pursuing a
religion-blind constitutional ideal." TRIBE, mpra note 140, at 821; see also Pfeffer, supra
note 194. Professor Tribe refers to the intersection of classifications required by the free
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chief difficulty with the Dittman-Brandon analysis is that it is apetitio
princii.
It is not sufficient simply to advert to the establishment clause. It
is suggested that a court's task in deciding a religious meetings case is
to assay the interests served by the establishment clause and to weigh
these against the deprivation of freedom of speech, association and free
exercise rights which necessarily would accompany a determination
that the establishment clause should assume priority. To effectuate the
commands of the establishment clause, the means chosen must be the
least burdensome alternative on the exercise of first amendment free-
doms.273 In most cases the establishment issues that would be of great-
est concern would be prevention of ostensible endorsement and subtle
coercion to religion.
Under this analysis, the state could suppress religious meetings
only where the threat or reality of coercion is clear and immediate, as
distinct from speculative or remote, and where the danger to unwilling
exercise clause and arguably condemned by the establishment clause as the "zone ofrequired
accommodation." TRIE, supra note 140, at 821 (emphasis in original).
In addition, Professor Tribe takes the position that classifications arguably required by
the free exercise clause (though not clearly required), and arguably condemned by the estab-
lishment clause, intersect to carve out of the establishment clause a "zone ofpermissible ac-
commodation." TRIBE, supra note 140, at 823 (emphasis in original). It might thus be said
that permitting religious meetings is arguably required by the free exercise clause, cf. Wis-
consin v. Yoder, 406 U.S. 205 (1972) (excusing religious students from compulsory school
attendance laws after eighth grade to permit private religious training and education), and
arguably condemned by the establishment clause. According to this view, a state could con-
stitutionally accommodate religious students by permitting religious meetings under appro-
priate circumstances.
At least one other constitutional guarantee predominates over the establishment clause:
freedom of speech. The only way in which to reconcile the Supreme Court's public forum
cases, see supra note 236 and accompanying text, with the establishment clause is to con-
clude that speech is valued more highly by the Court than establishment clause problems.
In each case where religious groups were held to have coequal rights of access to and use of
public streets and parks, an establishment clause violation could have been predicated on a
theory either of ostensible endorsement or financial benefit to religion.
273. The Supreme Court has indicated that the alternative of a disclaimer is preferable to
a total eclipse of free speech. See supra note 105. The courts have not considered the possi-
bility of diluting the appearance of ostensible school endorsement of religion by a widely
and effectively promulgated notice by which the school disclaims any endorsement of a reli-
gious creed. Similarly, a court might consider that when according formal recognition to a
student religious club would result in excessive entanglement or ostensible endorsement,
rather than banning all religious student group meetings, a school might be required to
regard such groups as free and voluntary associations, thus eligible for access to class-
rooms-albeit without all the rights accorded nonreligious student groups. No denial of
equal protection could be made out since the differential treatment accorded student groups
would be viewed as the product of a delicate weighing of the various fundamental rights at
stake.
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students substantially outweighs, either in magnitude or proximity, the
burden on religious students resulting from loss of associational and
speech activities. In weighing the respective burdens and risks, a court
might consider the following factors: the nature of the institution,274
the age and maturity of the students, 275 the extent to which the religious
meetings are purely the product of student effort or are significantly
dependent upon the state for their existence,276 and the degree to which
an accommodation of religion would otherwise be appropriate. 7  Ef-
fectuating the least burdensome alternative may, in certain cases, call
for affirmative accommodation of religious students by the public
school.
278
If, as a consequence of securing the goals of religious freedom and
freedom of speech and association, the effective scope of religious influ-
ence is widened or narrowed, it will not be due to any assistance or
hindrance by the state. The scope of religious influence will be com-
mensurate with the zeal of its advocates and the attractiveness of its
ideas.279
274. The status of a university as a "marketplace of ideas" and the need for a student
group to have high visibility on campus in order to place its ideas in competition with those
of other student groups, see supra notes 225-30 and accompanying text, argues strongly in
favor of the predominance of speech and association interests in the university context. In
addition, as the Chess court noted, university students rely upon the campus as their "total
community" and can expect a greater accommodation than high school students. In short,
the environment of the university may be determinative in this context. See infra note 287.
275. University students are expected to possess sufficient intellectual sophistication in
most situations, high school students in fewer situations, and grade school students almost
never.
276. If, for example, the religious student group is dependent upon financial stipends
from the school, the meetings lack the required independence of voluntary student effort.
277. See supra note 271.
278. The school might restrict religious student groups to specified times and places, such
as before or after school or during lunch periods, to dispel any appearance of a curricular
tie-in. Rather than accord formal recognition, the school might regard the groups as free
and voluntary associations. See supra note 273. Finally, if state law or school policy re-
quired a web. of school-student oversight, actualy or potentially entangling the school in
religious affairs, a court should closely scrutinize the regulations to ascertain whether some
less intrusive regulations might achieve the same objectives.
Professor Tribe has noted:
If individuals and groups are to enjoy meaningful religious freedom, the protection
afforded by the free exercise clause must vary with the extent of governmental
regulation and subsidy in society generally. . . . [W]e must consider whether a
nation committed to religious pluralism must, in the age of the affirmative state,
make active provision for maximum diversity; we must ask whether, in the present
age, religious tolerance must cease to be simply a negative principle and must be-
come a positive commitment that encourages the flourishing of conscience.
TRIm, supra note 140, at 834.
279. Cf. Zorach v. Clauson, 343 U.S. 306,313 (1952) ("We sponsor an attitude on the part
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IV. CONCLUSION
The wall of separation between church and state embodied in the
establishment clause does not mandate aper se rule prohibiting reli-
gious meetings on public school property. Religious student meetings
do not in all circumstances bear the earmarks of those elements of af-
firmative sponsorship or ostensible endorsement of religion condemned
by the establishment clause. So long as the meetings are voluntary and
tailored to avoid the risk that nonparticipating students will be coerced,
state action permitting such meetings does not impermissibly advance
religion. Nor is there excessive entanglement with religion associated
with such meetings.
Substantial first amendment rights to freedom of speech, associa-
tion and free exercise of religion are eclipsed by exclusion of religious
groups' meetings from the public campus. Accordingly, only by a deli-
cate balancing of the competing and important interests which are at
stake can religious students in the public schools enjoy those first
amendment freedoms which they brought with them through the
schoolhouse gate.280
V. POSTSCRIPT
During the writing of this comment, the United States Supreme
Court had not decided a case involving student religious meetings on a
public school or university campus. While this comment was- being
printed, however, the Supreme Court decided Widmar v. Vincent,2 1 in
which the Court affirmed the Eighth Circuit's decision in Chess v.
Widmar.282 The Widmar Court's holding was a narrow one:
Having created a forum generally open to student groups, the
University seeks to enforce a content-based exclusion of reli-
gious speech. Its exclusionary policy violates the fundamental
principle that a state regulation of speech should be content-
neutral, and the University is unable to justify this violation
under the applicable constitutional standards.283
In Widmar, the Court explicitly recognized for the first time the
of government that shows no partiality to any one group and that lets each flourish accord-
ing to the zeal of its adherents and the appeal of its dogma.").
280. See supra text accompanying note 219.
281. 102 S. Ct. 269 (1981).
282. 635 F.2d 1310 (8th Cir. 1980), aff'd sub nom. Widmar v. Vincent, 102 S. Ct. 269
(1981); see supra notes 83-86, 100, 134-37, 152-54, 187-90, 198, 239-42, & 247 and accompa-
nying text.
283. 102 S. Ct. at 278.
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rights of religious students in public universities actively to promote
religious ideas within the competitive intellectual marketplace.284' In
addition, the Court explicitly acknowledged religious worship and dis-
cussion as forms of speech and association protected by the first
amendment.285 Widmar thus confirmed much of the analysis and
many of the conclusions set forth in this comment. Because the Court
expressly limited its holding to the case before it and based its decision
solely on rights of free speech and association,286 many questions re-
main unanswered. This postscript briefly explores those questions and
the reach of the Widmar decision.
The Widmar Court began its analysis with a reaffirmation of the
rule that students retain first amendment rights of speech and associa-
tion on the public university campus.287 Moreover, the Court stated
that the public university campus is, for its students, a qualified public
forum.288 By providing space for student groups, the University of
Missouri had "created a forum generally open for use by student
284. Id. at 272-73. This comment suggests this right. See supra notes 209-32 and accom-
panying text.
285. Id. at 274. The majority of the Court viewed this proposition as well established,
citing, among other cases, Niemotko v. Maryland, 340 U.S. 268 (1951). For a discussion of
Niemotlko, see supra note 231. As noted by Justice White in his dissenting opinion, however,
the cases cited do not stand for this precise proposition. 102 S. Ct. at 281-82 n.2 (White, J.,
dissenting). Although the proposition may be inferred from these cases, Widmar is the first
case in which the Court has directly considered the paradoxical assertions that certain
speech is at once protected by the first amendment's free speech clause and condemned by.
its establishment clause. See supra notes 209-11 and accompanying text.
Justice White argued for a distinction between "religious worship" qua speech and
speech about religion; he contended that the latter should be protected by the first amend-
ment, and the former should not. 102 S. Ct. at 281 (White, J., dissenting). Religious worship
cannot be protected by the first amendment, according to Justice White, else the "Religion
Clauses would be emptied of any independent meaning in circumstances in which religious
practice took the form of speech." Id. at 282.
The majority, viewing religious worship qua speech as indistinguishable in principle
from other protected speech, rejected Justice White's distinction on three grounds: (1) it is
impossible to ascertain when hymn singing, scripture reading, and biblical teaching cease to
be protected "speech" and become unprotected "worship"; (2) administering the distinction
at the operational level would require inquiry into the significance of the acts and thus
would improperly entangle the public school and the courts with religion; and (3) the dis-
tinction is irrelevant because it is not clear that a state provides greater support to religion by
permitting religious worship among converts than by permitting admittedly protected
proselytizing. .d. at 274 n.6.
286. Id. at 276 n.13, 278.
287. Id. at 273 n.5. The Court observed that the "college classroom with its surrounding
environs is peculiarly the 'marketplace of ideas."' Id. (quoting Healy v. James, 408 U.S.
169, 180 (1972)); see supra notes 217-30 and accompanying text.
288. 102 S. Ct. it 273 n.5. This comment urges recognition of this principle. See supra
notes 231-37 and accompanying text.
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groups." '289 The exclusion of religious student groups, the Court stated,
was a form of discrimination based on the desire to use this forum to
engage in protected religious worship and discussion.2 90 To justify this
discriminatory exclusion of speech, "the University must . . . satisfy
the standard of review appropriate to content-based exclusions. It must
show that the regulation is necessary to serve a compelling state interest
and that it is narrowly drawn to achieve that end."
291
The Court next examined the University's proffered interest in ex-
cluding the religious student groups. The University claimed a compel-
ling interest in meeting its obligations under the Federal and Missouri
Constitutions to avoid an establishment of religion.292 The Court de-
clared, without elaboration, that a state interest in maintaining a strict
separation of church and state is not only legitimate, but
"compelling."293
According to the Court, however, the University's "equal access"
policy would not have the primary effect of advancing religion.294 Ac-
cordingly, the University's asserted interest, under the circumstances
presented, did not justify the exclusion.295 While religious groups ad-
mittedly would benefit from the open forum policy, the Court was "sat-
isfied" that any religious benefits of an open forum at the University
289. Id. at 273.
290. Id. at 274. Prior to Widmar, it was unclear whether according different treatment to
religious speech was to be considered a form of discrimination or merely the inevitable
result of establishment clause prohibitions. See supra note 257. Widmar does not entirely
eliminate the uncertainty, however, because there the Court determined that there was no
violation of the establishment clause; accordingly, the Court did not have to decide whether
the establishment clause may in some cases effectively compel discrimination against reli-
gious speech.
291. 102 S. Ct. at 274.
292. Id.
293. Id. at 275. This comment suggests that a state's obligation to comply with its consti-
tutional obligations could not appropriately be characterized as an "interest" of government
and analyzed under the compelling state interest test. See supra notes 265-69 and accompa-
nying text.
294. 102 S. Ct. at 276. The University of Missouri also argued that because the Missouri
Constitution imposed more stringent prohibitions against indirect state support for religion
than the Federal Constitution, the state had a compelling interest in ensuring greater separa-
tion of church and state than is required under the Federal Constitution. Id. at 277. The
fWidmar Court noted, however, that such a state interest is circumscribed by the free exercise
clause and, in this case, by the free speech clause. Accordingly, the Court was "unable to
recognize the State's interest as sufficiently 'compelling' to justify content-based discrimina-
tion against [the students'] religious speech." Id. The Court expressly declined to decide
whether "a state interest, derived from its own constitution, could ever outweigh free speech
interests protected by the First Amendment." Id. (citing the supremacy clause, U.S. CONST.
art. VI, § 2). This comment suggests a negative answer. See supra note 270.
295. 102 S. Ct. at 277.
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"would be 'incidental' within the meaning of our cases." 296
Two "factors" were said to be "especially relevant" to the determi-
nation of primary effect in Widmar.2 97 First, the Court stated that "an
open forum in a public university does not confer any imprimatur of
State approval on religious sects or practices." '298 Second, "the forum is
available to a broad class of non-religious as well as religious speakers
.... ,"299 Yet, the Court did not view an "equal access" policy as a
universal solvent for all establishment clause concerns; the Court im-
plicitly, but clearly, adopted a facts and circumstances test for the issue
of primary effect, the precise contours of which were not delineated. 300
Potential problems of "entanglement with religion" were relegated
to a footnote. The Court agreed with the Eighth Circuit that the uni-
versity would risk greater entanglement with religion by attempting to
enforce its exclusion of religious speech.3° '
Widmar leaves several questions unanswered. The first question is
what the result will be where the forum is not already made generally
available to student.groups. The Widmar Court particularly empha-
sized the equal access features of the case, distinguishing it from those
cases in which state and lower federal courts have invalidated statutes
permitting school facilities to be used by religious groups, but pot by
others.302 The Court observed that in those cases the state may appear
296. Id. The Court offered no explicit analysis of thefnancialbeneft issues, leaving open
the possibility that in other circumstances the financial benefit infirmity may not necessarily
be cured by an equal access policy. See supra notes 110-52 and accompanying text. Widmar
unquestionably demonstrates, however, that a challenge to an equal access policy on
financial benefit grounds will seldom, if ever, be successful.
297. 102 S. Ct. at 276.
298. Id. The Court also observed that university students are less impressionable than
younger students, id. n.14, and that a university is peculiarly the marketplace of ideas. Id. at
273 n.5. The Court thus confirmed this comment's analysis and conclusions on this point.
See supra notes 63-109 and accompanying text.
299. 102 S. Ct. at 277. "The provision of benefits to so broad a spectrum of groups is an
important index of secular effect." Id. This conclusion was supported by past decisions.
See supra notes 122-26 & 146-47 and accompanying text.
300. This comment suggests the need for such a test, and sets forth relevant criteria. See
supra notes 274-78 and accompanying text.
301. 102 S. Ct. at 275 n.ll.
302. Id. at 275 n.10, 276 n.13. One of the cases which the Court purported to distinguish
was Brandon v. Board of Educ., 635 F.2d 971 (2d Cir. 1980), which involved a high school
setting. See supra notes 71-79 and accompanying text. The Widmar Court stated that, un-
like the instant case, the facilities denied to the religious students in Brandon were not avail-
able to other groups, and that the students in Brandon asserted only free exercise claims. 102
S. Ct. at 276 n.13. In brief, the Court explained, Brandon was not an "equal access" case.
This critical distinction, however, is based on a serious misstatement of the facts and the
students' claims in Brandon. The high school facilities in Brandon were made generally
available to other students, and the religious students in that case did assert rights to free
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to have ostensibly endorsed the speaker.3 3 This comment suggests that
there is no right to facilities on demand;3° but the mere circumstance
that only religious students avail themselves of the forum, or are the
first to be extended the privilege, is properly only one factor to be con-
sidered in determining the question of primary effect.
305
A second question remaining after Widmar is whether the same
analysis applies in the high school setting. This comment suggests that
an equal access policy instituted in a high school does not differ in first
amendment principle from that in a college or university; that is, a pub-
lic high school generally may not constitutionally exclude religious stu-
dent groups and speakers from a public forum. 06 The circumstances
unique to the high school context, however, are factors to be taken into
account in determining the establishment clause issues of primary effect
and risk of entanglement. 07 Thus, it is suggested that a high school
may properly exclude religious speech only if, upon a proper balancing
of the competing constitutional interests, the interests served by the es-
tablishment clause in a particular case clearly outweigh the values in-
herent in freedom of speech, freedom of association, and free exercise
of religion.
308
A third unanswered question concerns the extent to which rights to
free exercise and equal protection are implicated by the exclusion of
religious speech from the public campus. The Widmar Court based its
decision solely on rights of free speech and association 0 9 and expressly
declined to reach the question of the extent, if any, to which free exer-
cise and equal protection interests are infringed by the challenged regu-
lation.310 In a case where free speech and association rights do not
speech, association, and equal protection. 635 F.2d at 979-80. This erroneous distinction is
particularly unfortunate because it will undoubtedly become a controlling factor in future
religious meetings cases.
303. 102 S. Ct. at 275 n.10.
304. See supra note 252 and accompanying text.
305. See supra notes 275-78 and accompanying text.
306. See supra notes 274-75 and accompanying text.
307. See supra notes 274-75 and'accompanying text.
308. See supra notes 273-78 and accompanying text; cf. Landmark Communications, Inc.
v. Virginia, 435 U.S. 829 (1980) (setting forth test for power of state to impose criminal
sanctions on third persons who are strangers to state proceedings for publishing information
regarding confidential proceedings).
309. 102 S. Ct. at 276 n.13. The Court also stated: "We limit our holding to the case
before us." Id. at 277; see also id. at 278 n.20 ("Our holding is limited to the context of a
public forum qreated by the University itself.").
310. Id. at 276 n.13.
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loom so large,3"' aggrieved religious students could, of course, assert
free exercise and equal protection claims against a public school or uni-
versity. Thus, the analysis of the free exercise issues set forth in this
comment should apply in such cases.3 12 With respect to an equal pro-
tection claim, on the other hand, the Court, having ignored the equal
protection clause entirely in Widmar, may have jettisoned equal protec-
tion doctrine from the analysis of content-based exclusions of
speech.3
Another question left unanswered by Widmar is how the Court
would analyze potential entanglement problems in a case where the
provisions of state or local law require a public school or university to
exercise more intrusive.monitoring and supervision of student activities
than occurred in Widmar. This comment suggests an answer:314 a
court should ascertain, among other things, whether a less intrusive
regulation could accomplish substantially the same objectives, and
whether a student religious group could be accorded the less formal
status of a free and voluntary association if recognition as a campus
"club" would impermissibly entangle school authorities with
religion.315
Finally, and most significantly, Widmar did not reach the most
central and troublesome questions presented by the religious meetings
cases to which this comment is primarily addressed: "the questions
that would arise if State accommodation of Free Exercise and Free
Speech rights should, in a particular case, conflict with the prohibitions
of the Establishment Clause. '31 6 This comment urges the need for a
fresh analytical framework for achieving a direct and forthright recon-
ciliation between these conflicting rights, in the nature of a balancing
test.317
The most interesting question remaining after Widmar is how the
Court will reconcile these conflicting provisions in a future case. The
Widmar Court clearly did not adopt anything like the balancing test
311. Such a case may arise where a public school has not created a public forum or has
made no content-based exclusion of speech.
312. See supra notes 197-205, 238-79 and accompanying text.
313. The Court has already held that a content-based exclusion of speech may abridge
both the free speech and equal protection clauses. See Police Dep't of Chicago v. Mosley,
408 U.S. 92, 96 (1972); see also supra notes 231-36 and accompanying text. In Widmar, in
holding the content-based exclusion of speech unlawful, the Court based its decision solely
on free speech and association rights without reference to the equal protection clause,
314. See supra notes 273, 278 and accompanying text.
315. See supra notes 273, 278 and accompanying text.
316. 102 S. Ct. at 276 n.13.
317. See supra notes 240-78 and accompanying text.
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urged by this comment; it applied the traditional compelling state inter-
est test appropriate to any form of prior restraint.318 Of course, having
found no conflict in Widmar, there were no conflicting interests to bal-
ance. The Court thus left open the possibility that some form of bal-
ancing may be appropriate where these fundamental rights are in
conflict.
On the other hand, in Widmar, as in any religious meetings case,
the prohibitions of the establishment clause were at least arguably in
conflict with rights to free speech, freedom of association, and free ex-
ercise; that is, the fundamental interests served by the establishment
clause were-and in nearly every religious meetings cases are-impli-
cated, albeit not so substantially as to constitute an establishment of
religion.3 19 The Court nevertheless applied traditional strict scrutiny,
which this comment suggests was insufficient. Because the prohibitions
of the establishment clause were at least arguably implicated, the
Court's application of the compelling state interest test leads to the in-
escapable inference that in the future the Court will extend the applica-
tion of this test to a case where such rights are clearly in conflict.
Assuming that the Court will apply the compelling state interest
test to reconcile these conflicting rights in a future case, the critical
question is how they can satisfactorily be resolved by this standard.
This comment eschews the application of this test in the religious meet-
ings context because, as ordinarily applied, it is an invitation to engage
in circular reasoning: to find in a given case that a state's asserted in-
terest in separating church and state is sufficiently "compelling," that is,
that the establishment clause ought to prevail over other first amend-
ment rights, is "to announce an inevitable result, and the test is no test
at all."
320
Only imagination limits the number of "tests" which can be de-
vised. The exact formulation of the test that is ultimately employed,
however, is less important than the recognition that the question of an
establishment clause violation cannot be decided in isolation from the
question of the infringement of other fundamental first amendment
rights. Accordingly, it is suggested that if the compelling state interest
test is so employed, part of a court's determination of whether a state's
asserted interest in separating church and state is sufficiently compel-
318. 102 S. Ct. at 274-78.
319. See supra notes 252-54, 272 and accompanying text.
320. Illinois Elections Bd. v. Socialist Workers Party, 440 U.S. 173, 188-89 (1979) (Black-
mun, J., concurring); see supra text accompanying note 272.
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ling should include the type of weighing analysis suggested in this
comment.
321
Douglas W. Abendroth
321. See supra notes 238-78 and accompanying text.
